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Garza v. Idaho: Prioritizing Client Autonomy in
Criminal Appeals Regardless of an Appeal Waiver
Jackie McDonnell*
In Garza v. Idaho, the Supreme Court resolved a split in authority
about whether courts should presume counsel prejudiced a criminal
defendant’s case when counsel failed to file a notice of appeal, holding
the presumption of prejudice applies regardless of a defendant’s appeal
waiver. By correctly extending Roe v. Flores-Ortega’s rule which
requires courts to presume prejudice, the Court expanded the
presumption’s application for ineffective assistance of counsel claims
under the Sixth Amendment.
Overall, Garza protected a defendant’s right to appeal despite an
appeal waiver, as counsel must now act on the defendant’s appeal
request. If counsel fails to file a notice of appeal, defendants have a lower
burden in proving counsel’s ineffective assistance after Garza. The
decision, however, may decrease the leniency and finality of plea bargain
sentencings because of the likely increase in appeals.
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INTRODUCTION
The growth of the United States in the late 1700s necessitated the
assistance of attorneys, which gave rise to attorney-client relationships.1
From the outset of this relationship, the general population has held both
criticism2 and respect for the legal profession.3 Despite these differing

1. See A Brief Guide to the History of Lawyers, SMOKEBALL (May 8, 2018),
https://www.smokeball.com/blog/brief-guide-to-the-history-of-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/9J2A59JW] (noting that in order for a society to need lawyers, there must be a certain level of
advancement. The U.S. colonies achieved that level of advancement when they began to thrive
financially in the late 1700s.); see also Jonathan Barker & Matthew Cosentino, Who’s in Charge
Here? The Ethics 2000 Approach to Resolving Lawyer-Client Conflicts, GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
505, 505 (2003) (“While ethics rules are frequently concerned with ensuring that a lawyer
represents her client well, the question of whether she represents the client according to the client’s
wishes is generally overlooked.”).
2. SMOKEBALL, supra note 1 (explaining that many people in the U.S. colonies were hostile to
lawyers, as some colonies even outlawed lawyers); Susan Katcher, Legal Training in the United
States: A Brief History, WIS. INT’L L.J. 335, 337 (2006) (explaining that English prejudice against
lawyers took root in America as well. “Distrust of lawyers became an institution.”); see TOM
PAXTON, ONE MILLION LAWYERS (1988). In this satirical folk song, the singer laments that “[i]n
ten years we’re gonna have one million lawyers.” For the singer, an abundance of lawyers is worse
than disease and war, causing him to wonder “[h]ow the world’s gonna take any more [lawyers].”
3. See SMOKEBALL, supra note 1 (explaining that twenty-five of the fifty-six men who signed
the Declaration of Independence were lawyers); see also Harrison Barnes, Top 20 Reasons Why
There Is No Better Profession Than Practicing Law, BCG ATT’Y SEARCH,
https://www.bcgsearch.com/article/900046288/Top-20-Reasons-Why-There-Is-No-BetterProfession-Than-Practicing-Law/ [https://perma.cc/G4HR-X6RH] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019) (“In
fact [practicing law] can be about the clearest path to security, wealth and prestige there is.”).
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viewpoints, attorneys provide services important to society.4 While
attorneys have many roles,5 the United States’ adversarial model of
adjudication established the attorney’s primary role as servient to her
client.6 In criminal proceedings, though, a defense attorney serves as an
advocate for her client but also as an officer of the court with
responsibilities to the State.7 As agents of both their client and the court,8
4. Michael Serota, Opinion, A Matter of Perspective: A Lawyer’s Place in Society, 38 A.BA.
STUDENT LAW. 16, 16 (2010) (arguing that lawyers inevitably have an unfavorable reputation
because the media continues to demean the legal profession with caricatures. For example, the
media portrays the “greedy partner at a top law firm in the flashy car; the rough-and-tumble district
attorney; the seedy criminal defense attorney.” However, lawyers play a more nuanced and
significant role in our society than these caricatures suggest.); see Diane Jorgensen, Role of a
Lawyer in Society, DEL. L. INC. (Oct. 30, 2016), https://www.bestbuddiesdelaware.org/role-lawyersociety/ [https://perma.cc/67YY-WHWY] (noting that any individual interested in finding the best
way to resolve a dispute or to prevent one from occurring seeks the help of an attorney. When
people consult attorneys, it helps them avoid a wide range of problems and reduce financial loss.);
see also Tim O’Hare, Contributions Lawyers Make to Our Society, THE L. OFFS. OF TIM O’HARE,
https://oharelawfirm.com/dallas-personal-injury-attorney/contributions-lawyers-make-to-oursociety/ [https://perma.cc/4UY7-W2NB] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (explaining that attorneys are
advocates and advisors for society. Without attorneys, individuals would have to undertake legal
research and best apply it to their circumstances.).
5. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Preamble & Scope, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_pr
ofessional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preamble_scope/
[https://perma.cc/d2a4-4y9w] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019) (describing a lawyer as a representative
of clients and thereby an advisor, advocate, negotiator, and evaluator); see also Jeena Cho, What Is
the Role of Lawyers? ABOVE THE L. (Aug. 24, 2015), https://abovethelaw.com/2015/08/what-isthe-role-of-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/j6qa-d6yg] (noting Abraham Lincoln’s description of
lawyers as “peacemakers” and concluding that lawyers self-define the kind of lawyer they are).
6. Nancy Amoury Combs, Understanding Kaye Scholer: The Autonomous Citizen, the
Managed Subject and the Role of the Lawyer, 82 CAL. L. REV. 663, 683 (1994) (explaining how
clients control the proofs and run the process of their trial. In turn, this preserves client autonomy
by providing a client with the fullest voice possible in her case. Attorneys must act as an assistant
to that process.); see Daniel Markovits, What Are Lawyers For?, 47 AKRON L. REV. 135, 135
(2014) (“[A]t least with respect to lawyers who function as litigators . . . lawyers should serve their
clients.”).
7. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARD 4-1.2, A.B.A.
(2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition/
[https://perma.cc/T49Y-HE4N] (explaining that if the defendant does not have an attorney, a court
should not be able to hear the case. The standard describes defense counsels’ “difficult task” of
serving both the court and their clients. This entails “serv[ing] as their clients’ counselor and
advocate with courage and devotion; [ensuring] that constitutional and other legal rights of their
clients are protected; and [rendering] effective, high-quality legal representation with integrity.”);
but see Jacob G. Hornberger, Private Attorneys Are Not “Officers of the Court”, FUTURE OF
FREEDOM
FOUND.:
HORNBERGER’S
BLOG
(Sept.
23,
2009),
https://www.fff.org/2009/09/01/hornbergers-blog-september-2009/
[https://perma.cc/7Z9CGQHL] (arguing that viewing lawyers as officers of the court is “one of the most pernicious—and
false—doctrines ever promulgated in the legal profession.” Rather, attorneys should serve as agents
for their clients, not for the state.).
8. See Camille A. Gear, The Ideology of Domination: Barriers to Client Autonomy in Legal

274

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

defense attorneys may be uncertain about where their power ends and
their clients’ autonomy begins.9
As such, in the criminal attorney-client relationship, a common area of
conflict is whether the attorney or client trumps in the decision-making
process.10 If counsel disregards a criminal defendant’s wishes, the
defendant can claim ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment11 for redress.12 In evaluating a claim of ineffective
assistance, courts rely on the standard the Supreme Court established in
Ethics Scholarship, 107 YALE L.J. 2473, 2473–74 (1998) (describing three prevailing models of
lawyering when a client’s wishes conflict with her attorney’s: the lawyer-as-statesman, the lawyeras-friend, and the lawyer-as-hired-gun. The lawyer-as-statesman theory provides that a lawyer
should pursue a client’s goals only if those goals advance the legal system’s view of justice. The
lawyer-as-friend model, however, encourages lawyers to pursue only the clients’ causes which
advance the ideals of the lawyer’s moral code. The lawyer-as-hired-gun theory prompts counsel to
advance her client’s causes only if those causes allow the client to exercise her rights freely, as
intended by the Constitution.); see also James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the
Characterization “Officer of the Court”, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 387 (2000) (explaining that
counsel’s only duty to the court that is inconsistent with her duty to the client is to cite unfavorable
authority or facts).
9. Gear, supra note 8, at 2473 (describing the two contrary goals that society requires lawyers
to meet. First, lawyers must facilitate client autonomy. Second, though, lawyers must use their
power to prevent clients from pursuing immoral goals—thereby impinging on client autonomy.
Ethicists have resolved this tension by advising attorneys to limit a client’s autonomy only when
the client’s moral code is opposite to that of the attorney’s.); but see MONROE H. FREEDMAN &
ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 42 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that while
representing her client, an attorney cannot be tempered by her moral judgment of the client or of
the client’s case).
10. Arnold R. Rosenfeld, In Lawyer-Client Relationship, Who Makes the Decisions?, NEW
ENG.: IN-HOUSE (July 16, 2012), https://newenglandinhouse.com/2012/07/16/in-lawyer-clientrelationship-who-makes-the-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/39UN-5J85] (noting that even when a
criminal lawyer insists on making all of the strategic decisions about her client’s case, she should
consult with her client and explain her reasoning before putting the decision into effect); see
Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel
and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1998) (explaining that the legal profession is “sharply divided” as to how decisionmaking power should be allocated. For example, legal scholars “vigorously disagree” about the
appropriate role for the lawyer in wielding decision-making power in the attorney-client
relationship.); see also DAVE FRISHBERG, MY ATTORNEY BERNIE (1987) (The singer in this jazz
song describes counsel’s control over him such that “[counsel] tells me what to do . . . [counsel]
says, we sue, we sue/[counsel] says, we sign, we sign.”); see generally Paul R. Tremblay, On
Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client,
1987 UTAH L. REV. 515 (1987) (noting that the attorney-client relationship is governed by informed
consent in that lawyers must act only, or at least primarily, on the direction of their clients).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”); see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). In
McMann, the Court expanded the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the assistance of counsel to the
guarantee of the assistance of effective counsel. The Court reasoned that “if the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of
incompetent counsel.” Id.
12. See Barker & Cosentino, supra note 1 at 514 (explaining that the list of actions counsel must
take in order to provide effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment grants courts administrative
efficiency when determining whether or not counsel provided effective assistance).
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Strickland v. Washington.13 Under the Strickland standard, a defendant
must prove two prongs: (1) counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) counsel’s performance
prejudiced the defendant’s case.14 Cases like Roe v. Flores-Ortega
addressed the Strickland standard in the context of a defendant’s appellate
rights.15 In Flores-Ortega, the Court held that courts should presume a
defendant automatically satisfied Strickland’s second prong if counsel
failed to file a notice of appeal.16
The Court in Garza v. Idaho extended its application of the FloresOrtega presumption, further clarifying the Strickland standard.17 Before
Garza, the Court had not defined how appeal waivers affect ineffective
assistance analyses.18 As a result, the courts of appeals inconsistently
13. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699 (1984); see James K. Howard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases, CRIM. L. PRACTITIONER (Nov. 22, 2013) http://wclcriminallawbrief.blogspot.com/2013/11/ineffective-assistance-of-counsel-in.html [https://perma.cc/22B5ZZJN] (describing the most common instances when clients bring ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in murder cases: (1) when counsel is inexperienced, (2) when counsel fails to search for
mitigating evidence in murder trials, and (3) when counsel fails to object to the requirement that
the defendant wear restraints in front of the jury).
14. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; see Strickland v. Washington, LEGAL DICTIONARY (Dec. 10,
2018),
https://legaldictionary.net/strickland-v-washington/
[https://perma.cc/B3XZ-HH8N]
(explaining that the Strickland Court did not find that the facts in Strickland satisfied either prong
of the Court’s test for ineffective assistance of counsel. First, while counsel’s decisions were not
what other lawyers would have done, the decisions were at least reasonable enough for Sixth
Amendment effective assistance purposes. Second, the facts weighed too strongly against the
Strickland defendant at trial; thus the defendant’s sentence would not have changed if counsel made
different choices. The Court noted that if a court can dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim by first analyzing the second prong, doing so is appropriate.).
15. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); see Dan McCue, Justices to Resolve Circuit
Split Over Appeal Waivers, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (June 18, 2018)
https://www.courthousenews.com/justices-to-resolve-split-over-appeal-waivers/
[https://perma.cc/66JK-KLPA] (explaining that eight circuits adopted Flores-Ortega’s
presumption. Two circuits, however, had not adopted the presumption and thus required a showing
of prejudice.).
16. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483–84; compare Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S at 483–84 (explaining
that prejudice is presumed to satisfy Strickland’s second prong if counsel failed to file a notice of
appeal that the defendant requested), with United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)
(concluding that prejudice is presumed if “the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his
trial.”), and Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 (1988) (holding that prejudice is presumed if the
accused is left “entirely without the assistance of counsel on appeal.”).
17. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 740 (2019); see Debra Cassens Weiss, SCOTUS Rules 6-3
for Inmate on Ineffective Assistance; Dissent Implies Gideon Was Wrongly Decided, A.B.A. J. (Feb.
27, 2019, 1:09 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme-court-rules-6-3-forinmate-whose-lawyer-refused-to-file-appeal-notice-because-of-waiver [https://perma.cc/2USDCEG8] (explaining that the issue in both Garza and Flores-Ortega was whether the defendants
were entitled to a presumption that their attorneys’ failure to file notices of appeal caused them
prejudice).
18. See Evan Lee, Opinion Analysis: Defense Lawyer’s Refusal to File Requested Appeal
Constitutes Ineffective Assistance, Despite Defendant’s Appeal Waiver, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 28,
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applied Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice, meaning only some
defendants had to prove prejudice under Strickland’s second prong.19 In
Garza, the Supreme Court determined how an appeal waiver affects an
ineffective assistance claim when counsel failed to file a notice of
appeal.20 Relying on its ineffective assistance precedents, the Garza
Court confirmed that Flores-Ortega’s presumption automatically
satisfies Strickland’s second prong when the defendant agreed to an
appeal waiver.21
Thus, the Court in Garza resolved the split in authority by holding that
Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice applies regardless of an appeal
waiver.22 Although Justice Thomas’s dissent conveyed that the
presumption improperly stretches Sixth Amendment protections, Justice
Sotomayor’s majority opinion correctly protected client autonomy.23
2019, 10:54 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/02/opinion-analysis-defense-lawyersrefusal-to-file-requested-appeal-constitutes-ineffective-assistance-despite-defendants-appealwaiver/ [https://perma.cc/2XZL-BHA2] (explaining that Flores-Ortega did not involve an appeal
waiver, as Garza did); see also Basem Besada & Luís L. Lozada, Gilberto Garza, Jr v. Idaho,
CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST. SUP. CT. BULL., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/171026 [https://perma.cc/T87S-NK9X] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (noting that the Garza Court
decided the scope and validity of appeal waivers balanced against a defendant’s right to file an
appeal).
19. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 743 (explaining that, for example, eight of the ten federal courts of
appeals to address the issue applied Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice when a defendant
signed an appeal waiver); see Christina Luedtke, Garza v. Idaho, WILLAMETTE L. ONLINE,
https://willamette.edu/law/resources/journals/wlo/scotuscg/2018/06/garza-v.-idaho.html
[https://perma.cc/839K-DXGY] (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (explaining that the Court granted
certiorari in Garza to resolve the circuit split as to whether a defendant deserves a presumption of
prejudice if she previously waived her right to appeal as part of a plea bargain).
20. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 740; see Amy Howe, Five New Grants, One CVSG, But No Arlene’s
Flowers, SCOTUSBLOG (June 18, 2018, 2:26 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/fivenew-grants-one-cvsg-but-no-arlenes-flowers/ [https://perma.cc/7T3V-S4CJ] (explaining that the
Supreme Court agreed to determine what the Garza defendant’s burden of proof was in proving
counsel’s ineffective assistance).
21. See Brief of the Cato Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Garza v. Idaho, 139
S. Ct. 738 (2019) (No. 17-1026) (explaining that the fundamental question in Garza is whether
courts should discard the principle of defendant autonomy when defendants waive certain appeal
rights as part of a plea bargain); see also Evan Lee, Argument Preview: Can a Criminal Defense
Lawyer Refuse to file an Appeal From a Guilty Plea Because of an Appeal Waiver?, SCOTUSBLOG
(Oct. 23, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/argument-preview-can-acriminal-defense-lawyer-refuse-to-file-an-appeal-from-a-guilty-plea-because-of-an-appealwaiver/ [https://perma.cc/96LT-MB8J] (explaining that Garza would answer: (1) whether it is a
defense attorney’s job to act “as an arm of the state” in enforcing a plea bargain against his client
and (2) whether a defense attorney should notify his client before the appeals deadline expires that
he will not be filing a notice of appeal).
22. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 742. The Garza Court reversed and remanded the Idaho Supreme
Court’s holding in a 6–3 decision and held that the Flores-Ortega presumption applies in satisfying
Strickland’s second prong.
23. Id. at 747 (asserting that an appeal waiver does not complicate the “straightforward
application” of Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice when counsel’s conduct denied the
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Without the Supreme Court’s guidance to lower courts, defendants would
continue to face inconsistent burdens in proving ineffective assistance
when counsel failed to file a notice of appeal.24
Part I of this Note begins by describing prosecutors’ increased reliance
on plea bargains containing appeal waivers.25 Part I continues with an
account of the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.26 Next,
Part II details the factual and procedural history of Garza and discusses
the Court’s decision as well as Justice Thomas’s dissent.27 Part III
analyzes why the majority in Garza was correct and consistent with the
Court’s jurisprudence in prioritizing client autonomy.28 Last, Part IV
explains the likely impact of Garza, including how it decreased courts’
and defendants’ burdens but may destabilize plea bargain processes.29
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS ARISING FROM PLEA
BARGAINS
In contemporary criminal proceedings, plea bargains are the most
common method of resolving cases.30 A plea bargain is an agreement
between a prosecutor and defendant in which the defendant agrees to

defendant a proceeding altogether); see Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (noting that the
Court will presume prejudice with no further showing from the defendant when a violation of the
right to counsel rendered the proceeding either unreliable or nonexistent).
24. See Garza v. State, Nos. 44015/ 44016, 2017 WL 444026, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Feb. 2,
2017). The Idaho Court of Appeals’ ruled that for Garza to succeed on his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, Garza would have had to show prejudice with evidence either that (1) his
appeal waiver was invalid or unenforceable or (2) the claimed issues on appeal were outside the
scope of the waiver. See also Luedtke, supra note 19 (noting that the minority of circuits required
a defendant to prove actual prejudice if her attorney failed to file a notice of appeal).
25. See infra Section I.A (discussing the mechanics of plea bargains and appeal waivers as well
as prosecutors’ increased reliance on appeal waivers).
26. See infra Section I.B (explaining the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel and how Flores-Ortega honed it).
27. See infra Part II (discussing Garza v. Idaho, the case at issue in this Note).
28. See infra Part III (arguing that Garza correctly aligns with the United States Supreme
Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence).
29. See infra Part IV (explaining Garza’s implications).
30. See Thea Johnson, Johnson on Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (July
30, 2019),
https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2019/07/johnson-on-perceptions-of-pleabargaining.html [https://perma.cc/CP3V-JW9U] (explaining that although plea bargaining is the
most common method of resolving cases in the criminal system, the public disapproves of it); see
Mark A. Friese, Plea Bargain Pitfalls, VOGEL L. FIRM (June 4, 2019),
https://www.vogellaw.com/blog/2019/06/plea-bargain-pitfalls.shtml
[https://perma.cc/2R5LGGMA] (stating that an estimated ninety to ninety-five percent of state court criminal cases are
resolved through the plea bargaining process. In federal criminal cases, there is a plea of guilty in
ninety-seven percent of cases.); see generally Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal,
30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 127, 128 (1995) (“Plea bargaining is the bedrock upon which modern
criminal justice practice rests.”).
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plead guilty in exchange for concessions from the prosecutor.31
Typically, the State offers a plea bargain when it has a strong case against
a defendant.32 Defendants who enter into a plea bargain frequently agree
to an appeal waiver.33 An appeal waiver requires the defendant’s promise
to not appeal her sentencing.34 While the Supreme Court held that appeal
waivers are constitutional,35 a minority of courts have held they are
invalid because of conflicts with due process, contract law, and public

31. Plea
Bargain,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.:
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/plea_bargain [https://perma.cc/U6UN-SM3W] (last visited Aug.
24, 2019); see Sara J. Berman, The Basics of a Plea Bargain, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/the-basics-plea-bargain.html [https://perma.cc/EGN6-U43K] (last visited Oct. 8,
2019) (explaining that the concessions a defendant may receive as part of a plea bargain may require
the prosecutor to drop charges, reduce a charge to a less serious offense, or recommend a specific
sentence to the judge).
32. Plea Bargaining, OFF. OF THE U.S. ATT’Y: JUST. 101, https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice101/pleabargaining [https://perma.cc/7FWX-4EUC] (last visited Aug. 24, 2019); but see When
Should You Accept a Plea Bargain in Your Criminal Case?, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/legalarticles/when-should-you-accept-a-plea-bargain-in-your-criminal-case-30893
[https://perma.cc/9JK2-FPN7] (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (explaining that prosecutors may offer
plea bargains to reduce their workload. A plea bargain, after all, moves a defendant through the
system faster, and sometimes the judge expects the prosecutor to make a plea bargain before the
court rules.).
33. Alexandra W. Reimelt, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and Waiver of the Right to
Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 871 (2010); see Thomas Seigel, Guilty Pleas and Appeals,
LAWYERS.COM (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/criminal/criminal-lawbasics/guilty-pleas-and-appeals.html [https://perma.cc/2LCW-5UC8] (last visited Oct. 8, 2019)
(explaining that during a hearing, the judge will typically state that a defendant may have no right
to appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea).
34. Kevin Bennardo, Post-Sentencing Appellate Waivers, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 347, 347
(2015); see A Generic Appeal Waiver Doesn’t Preclude Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
at
Sentencing,
THE
FED.
CRIM.
APPEALS
BLOG
(Aug.
25,
2018),
https://www.federalcriminalappealsblog.com/a-generic-appeal-waiver-doesnt-preclude-claim-ofineffective-assistance-of-counsel-at-sentencing-in-re-sealed-case-_-f-3d-_-d-c-circuit-no-163005-aug-17-2018/ [https://perma.cc/9LF5-EY7B] (noting that an appeal waiver requires a
defendant to waive the right to make an appeal or to seek review after sentencing).
35. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Criminal Resource Manual § 626 (2020); see Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970). In Brady, the Court held that when a defendant enters a plea of guilty
and the plea bargain contains an appeal waiver, the defendant forfeits a broad range of legal and
constitutional appellate claims which would have otherwise been available had the case gone to
trial.
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policy.36 Appeal waivers nonetheless remain a popular component of
plea bargains.37
Plea bargains involve important decisions that may confuse a
defendant, requiring counsel’s guidance.38 If counsel fails to properly
discuss a plea bargain with her client, the client can file an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.39 For instance, in Hill v. Lockhart, the
defendant filed an ineffective assistance claim alleging counsel

36. Reimelt, supra note 33, at 884 (explaining that one district court and a minority of state
courts held that plea bargains can never include an appeal waiver. These courts reasoned that appeal
waivers fail to satisfy the due process “knowing and voluntary” test for appeals because such a
waiver of future rights is inherently uninformed and unintelligent. These courts also concluded that
appeal waivers violate contract law because the parties, the State and the defendant, hold unequal
bargaining power. Additionally, they held that appeal waivers conflict with the public policy
concern of correcting errors in law and fact through the appeal process.); see Charis Stanek,
Supreme Court Must Strike Down Plea Bargaining, MIC (Aug. 3, 2012),
https://www.mic.com/articles/11949/supreme-court-must-strike-down-plea-bargaining
[https://perma.cc/SV6K-R7FQ] (explaining a study which demonstrated that when even an
innocent person faces the risk of a severe punishment by going to trial, she is more likely to accept
the plea bargain and thus eliminate the risk of the severe punishment); see also Justice in America
Episode 2: The 94%—Plea Deals, THE APPEAL (Aug. 1, 2018), https://theappeal.org/justice-inamerica-episode-2-the-94-plea-deals/ [https://perma.cc/2TF6-UUVL] (noting that plea bargaining
is often extremely coercive, even when the defendant is not guilty).
37. See Quin M. Sorenson, Appeal Rights Waivers: A Constitutionally Dubious Bargain, 65
FED. LAW. 32, 33 (2018) (explaining that appeal waivers appeared in plea agreements in the 1970s,
gained popularity in the 1990s, and have become nearly universal in many districts); see also
Bennardo, supra note 34, at 348 (noting that appeal waivers rose to popularity in the 1990s and are
currently common components of plea agreements in many federal districts).
38. See
Ineffective
Assistance of
Counsel
in
Plea Bargaining,
JUSTIA,
https://www.justia.com/criminal/plea-bargains/ineffective-assistance-of-counsel-in-pleabargaining/ [https://perma.cc/9KR3-XCES] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (explaining that a defendant
may feel pressure to accept a plea deal or may be confused about the consequences of her decision);
see also How Would You Waive Your Right to An Appeal?, LAW OFF. OF DANIEL A. HOCHHEISER,
(Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.hochheiser.com/Blog/2013/September/How-Would-You-WaiveYour-Right-to-an-Appeal-.aspx [https://perma.cc/5CHN-QEE] (noting that the decision to agree to
an appeal waiver should be made carefully as it may be “extremely dangerous”).
39. See Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining, supra note 38 (explaining that
when counsel fails to discuss a client’s options with her plea bargain, the defendant may have
recourse through a Sixth Amendment claim. To succeed, however, the defendant must demonstrate
severe misconduct by her attorney.); see also Alexis Kelly, Ineffective Representation in Plea
Bargains,
NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/ineffective-representation-pleabargains.html [https://perma.cc/6J2D-82ZP] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (explaining instances when
courts have found that counsel inadequately represented her client at the plea bargain stage. For
example, counsel was constitutionally ineffective when there was no negotiation at all on behalf of
a defendant; counsel failed to convey unbiased, complete, or correct information; and when counsel
understated or overstated plea bargain risks in order to pressure a defendant either to go to trial or
to plead guilty.); but see Emily Rubin, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Guilty Pleas: Toward
a Paradigm of Informed Consent, 80 VA. L. REV. 1699, 1700 (1994) (arguing that legal standards
for ineffective assistance of counsel are “ill-suited” to the context in which they are most common,
plea bargaining).
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inadequately advised him during the plea bargain process.40 In FloresOrtega, the defendant filed the same, claiming counsel insufficiently
communicated with him about appealing a plea bargain sentence.41
A. Plea Bargains Containing Appeal Waivers
Prosecutors have increasingly relied on appeal waivers in plea bargains
since appeal waivers’ inception in the 1970s.42 In fact, some attorney’s
offices require that every plea agreement include an appeal waiver.43 An
appeal waiver does not necessarily waive all claims on appeal, as the
waiver’s scope varies based on the language in its provision.44

40. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). In Hill, the defendant alleged ineffective assistance
of counsel after his attorney provided erroneous information about parole eligibility as part of his
plea agreement. Id; see Doug Plank, Criminal Law Update: Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
Extended to Plea Bargains, NAT’L LEGAL RSCH. GROUP, INC. (Apr. 13, 2012),
https://www.nlrg.com/criminal-law-legal-research/bid/77050/CRIMINAL-LAW-UPDATERight-to-Effective-Assistance-of-Counsel-Extended-to-Plea-Bargains [https://perma.cc/VG3XSVAU] (explaining that the Hill Court held that Strickland’s requirements extend to when an
attorney provides incompetent advice to a defendant that caused the defendant to accept a plea
agreement).
41. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000). The Flores-Ortega Court held that the
Strickland test applies to claims that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a
notice of appeal. See Thomas L. Root, Could SCOTUS Decision In Haymond “Bring Down
Supervised Release?”, LEGAL INFO. SERV. ASSOC. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.lisalegalinfo.com/tag/apprendi/ [https://perma.cc/34WK-5Q4M] (explaining that after the FloresOrtega decision, if a defendant asked her attorney to file a notice of appeal, and the attorney does
not, the attorney has provided ineffective assistance regardless of the appeal’s chance of success).
42. Bennardo, supra note 34, at 347 (noting that despite their popularity, appeal waivers have
the effect of preventing defendants from accurately valuing their rights during the plea bargaining
process. Appeal waivers also undermine a district court’s incentives in observing proper sentencing
practices.); see Sorenson, supra note 37, at 33 (“These [appeal waivers], among the most ubiquitous
in plea agreements, are also among the most constitutionally dubious.”).
43. Sorenson, supra note 37, at 33 (noting that a sizable majority of plea agreements across the
nation include some form of an appeal waiver provision); see generally Brandon Sample,
Requirement of Consideration for Appeal Waivers, SENTENCING.NET (Dec. 29, 2018),
https://sentencing.net/appeal/requirement-consideration-appeal-waivers [https://perma.cc/FNP5WPRT] (explaining that the government primarily treats the appeal waiver portion of a plea
agreement as boilerplate language. Courts therefore rarely examine the rights that a defendant must
give up in an appeal waiver.).
44. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Criminal Resource Manual § 626 (2020) (explaining that certain
constitutional claims survive appeal waivers and that the scope of the waivers will vary with each
case); but see Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing
Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 211 (2005) (“Scholars and litigants disagree about what is waived, by
whom, at what price, and how often.”).
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The two primary types of appeal waivers are broad45 and limited
waivers.46 A broad appeal waiver eliminates the defendant’s right to
appeal her sentence on any grounds.47 Broad waivers efficiently limit the
issues that appellate courts can address but prevent those courts’ review
of the sentencing process.48 In contrast, limited appeal waivers allow a
defendant to appeal a sentence if the prosecutor and defendant agreed to
a different one.49 Advantageously, parties can modify a limited waiver,
but these waivers may overburden appellate courts by failing to reduce
appealable issues.50

45. Bennardo, supra note 34, at 348–49 (explaining that waivers vary widely in scope from
broad blanket waivers of all appellate rights to individually-tailored waivers); see United States v.
Johnson, 67 F.3d 200, 202 (9th Cir. 1995). In Johnson, the court interpreted the appeal waiver’s
bar on appealing “any sentence” as barring the defendant’s appeal of issues arising from a law
enacted between the defendant’s plea and his sentencing.
46. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Criminal Resource Manual § 626 (2020) (explaining that some waivers
may be limited to specific issues for appeal, such as a particular sentence, sentencing range, or
guideline application); see Bennardo, supra note 34, at 349 (describing limited appeal waivers as
“individually-tailored waivers in which the defendant retains the right to appeal specified aspects
of the sentence under particular conditions.”).
47. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Criminal Resource Manual § 626 (2020) (noting that a broad appeal
waiver requires the defendant to waive any and all sentencing issues on appeal); but see King &
O’Neill, supra note 44, at 211 (“Recent decisions embracing broad appeal waivers have continued
to provoke criticism from commentators.”).
48. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Criminal Resource Manual § 626 (2020) (describing how broad appeal
waivers reduce claims available for appeal, but risk promoting guideline-free sentencing); see King
& O’Neill, supra note 44, at 223 (noting that legal experts have attacked broad appeal waivers as
“bad policy”); see also Michael M. O’Hear, Defendant Can Challenge Attorney’s Failure to Appeal
Despite 2255 Waiver, Seventh Circuit Says, MARQ. U. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Sept. 17, 2012),
https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2012/09/defendant-can-challenge-attorneys-failure-toappeal-despite-2255-waiver-seventh-circuit-says/ [https://perma.cc/2JGS-7E9X] (explaining that
broad appeal waivers have become a routine part of federal criminal practice. Narrow
interpretations of appeal waivers based on principles of reasonableness would help prevent
injustices to the defendant.).
49. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Criminal Resource Manual § 626 (2020) (explaining that a defendant
may appeal anything that differs from what the parties agreed to in the appeal waiver); see Angel
A. Castro, After Taking a Federal Plea Bargain, A.A. CASTRO C.L.A.N. PLLC,
https://www.aac3clan.com/new-york-criminal-attorney/federal-crime-plea-bargaining/afterfederal-plea-bargain/ [https://perma.cc/9DR7-VUY6] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (explaining, for
example, that if the plea agreement states that the prosecutor will recommend the lower half of the
available sentences for a particular offense, a limited appeal waiver would waive the defendant’s
right to appeal any sentence within the agreed-upon sentencing range. The defendant, however,
would still be able to appeal a sentencing outside of the agreed-upon range.).
50. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Criminal Resource Manual § 626 (2020) (noting that while limited
appeal waivers may be beneficial to the parties, they allow more claims to be appealed than with
broad waivers); see King & O’Neill, supra note 44, at 230 (explaining many prosecutors’ belief
that appeal waivers have reduced their appellate burden. As such, prosecutors with limited
resources value broad appeal waivers.).
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Overall, appeal waivers relinquish a defendant’s appeal right to some
degree.51 Legal scholars, however, regard the appeal right as nearly
sacrosanct.52 Some have even requested that the Supreme Court
explicitly recognize a due process right to appeal.53 Appeals, after all,
prevent a defendant’s wrongful conviction by correcting lower courts’
legal and factual errors.54 But if a defendant’s appeal waiver eliminates
her right to appeal, she can still file a habeas corpus claim to overturn a
wrongful conviction or sentencing.55 Habeas claims require a court to
51. Bennardo, supra note 34, at 347 (“These [appeal] waivers, executed as part of a defendant’s
plea agreement, relinquish the defendant’s right to appeal her yet-to-be-imposed sentence.”); see
Richard J. Ovelmen & Rachel A. Oostendorp, So You’re Telling Me There’s a Chance!—The
Difference
Between
Waiver
and
Forfeiture,
MONDAQ
(Mar.
7,
2018),
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/Litigation-Mediation-Arbitration/680498/So-You39reTelling-Me-There39s-A-Chance-The-Difference-Between-Waiver-And-Forfeiture
[https://perma.cc/W46N-UVM2] (describing that a waiver is the intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right); see generally Bruce R. Bryan, The Appeal Process, BRYAN
APPEALS, https://bryanappeals.com/resources/the-appeal-process [https://perma.cc/Q2NH-89FE]
(last visited Sept. 24, 2019) (noting that appeals are either of right or by permission. An appeal of
right occurs when the party can automatically bring the case to the appellate court, after the party’s
attorney files and serves a notice of appeal. Conversely, an appeal by permission requires the party
to ask the appellate court for permission to appeal the case.); Rule 11: Appeal by Permission from
Appellate Court to Supreme Court, TENN. ST. CTS., http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/rules/rulesappellate-procedure/11 [https://perma.cc/G6HF-LKUR] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
52. Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J.
62, 62 (1985) (noting that while the origins of the right to appeal are neither ancient nor
constitutional, the right has remained unquestioned); see Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative
Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 1 (2011) (explaining that criminal
appeals are a “crucially important feature” of the modern criminal process. Nevertheless, “[d]espite
being both important and prevalent . . . very little scholarly attention has been given to the subject
of criminal appeals.”).
53. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1219 (2013)
(explaining that while federal and state judicial systems have increasingly relied on the appeal
process to protect individual rights, the Supreme Court has repeated its nineteenth-century dicta
that permits the denial of the right to appeal); see also James E. Lobsenz, A Constitutional Right to
an Appeal: Guarding Against Unacceptable Risks of Erroneous Conviction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 375, 375–76 (1985) (explaining that in McKane v. Durston, a unanimous Supreme Court held
that no matter how grave the offense, a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to appeal.
Justice Brennan subsequently challenged this in Jones v. Barnes when he stated that McKane was
arguably wrong and that the Supreme Court would likely overrule it.).
54. Robertson, supra note 53, at 1225 (citing Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the
Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591, 591–92 (2009)) (stating that as well as correcting errors,
appellate rights protect innocent defendants against wrongful convictions); see The Right to Appeal,
CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-thegovernment-and-the-constitution/jud-acc-ind/right-2-appeal/ [https://perma.cc/LNA5-XZWJ] (last
visited Sept. 24, 2019) (explaining that a defendant’s right to appeal is the “the most obvious way
in which individual judges are [held] accountable” because another independent judge or group of
judges is able to review the decision).
55. Difference Between an Appeal and an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, BRODEN &
MICKELSEN (Aug. 20, 2008), https://www.brodenmickelsen.com/blog/difference-between-anappeal-and-an-application-for-writ-of-habeas-corpus/
[https://perma.cc/2NTL-YAFF].
A
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review a defendant’s conviction or sentencing,56 most commonly through
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment.57
B. Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has established and expanded
protections for criminal defendants.58 For example, in Johnson v. Zerbst,
the Supreme Court held that in federal trials, the government must supply

defendant can bring an application for a writ of habeas corpus if she loses her direct appeal or if
she elects not to pursue one. The habeas corpus procedure is used to raise issues that were not in
the record: issues that the defendant could not have raised on direct appeal. In most states and in
the federal system, the issues must be related to a denial of a constitutional right. Id. See Paul
Wallin, What is the Difference Between an Appeal and a Writ of Habeas Corpus?, WALLIN &
KLARICH,
https://www.wklaw.com/what-is-the-difference-between-an-appeal-and-a-writ-ofhabeas-corpus/ [https://perma.cc/AR6G-44MR] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (noting that both an
appeal and a habeas corpus claim are part of the appellate process).
56. See Know Your Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus (Criminal Cases), LAW OFF. OF THE S.
CTR.
FOR
HUM.
RTS.,
https://www.schr.org/files/post/HABEAS%20CORPUS%
20PROCEDURE%20-%20FEDERAL%20HABEAS%20CORPUS.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QS6J7RB] (last visited Nov. 6, 2019) (explaining that in a habeas corpus proceeding, the court considers
whether a person is being held illegally in prison or in jail or is illegally on probation or parole);
see also Jurisdiction: Habeas Corpus, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/
courts/jurisdiction-habeas-corpus [https://perma.cc/5QWB-ZEGD] (last visited Nov. 6, 2019)
(noting that a writ of habeas corpus challenges the legality of a prisoner’s detention and does not
necessarily involve an inquiry into the prisoner’s guilt or innocence).
57. See Difference Between an Appeal and an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra
note 55 (explaining that an “overwhelmingly large majority” of applications for a writ of habeas
corpus allege that a defendant’s attorney was ineffective); see also Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/ineffective_assistance_of_counsel [https://perma.cc/J947-VA3Z] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020)
(noting that ineffective assistance is a common habeas corpus claim because courts will overturn a
defendant’s conviction if the defendant succeeds with the claim); see also Corey Parker, Raising
an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Argument on Appeal, THE APP. L. FIRM,
https://theappellatelawfirm.com/blog/raising-ineffective-assistance-counsel-argument-appeal/
[https://perma.cc/FJ6X-ZPM3] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (explaining that when an ineffective
assistance of counsel argument is successful on appeal, the defendant’s conviction will be
overturned. Nonetheless, the prosecutor will likely have an opportunity to bring a new trial against
the defendant.); see generally Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 725–26 (1991) (describing the
petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim as a basis for his habeas appeal).
58. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1980) (clarifying that a defendant can argue
that her right to effective counsel was violated whether she pays for her attorney or has a courtappointed counsel); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 387 (1985) (holding that just as the
Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel at trial, the
Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to effective assistance when appealing a
conviction); see generally Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://californiainnocenceproject.org/issues-we-face/ineffective-assistance-of-counsel/
[https://perma.cc/5QMW-689F] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (explaining that ineffective assistance
of counsel, or “bad lawyering,” constitutes a violation of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. Bad lawyering results in an unlevel playing field for the defendant and frequently
leads to a wrongful conviction.).
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counsel to criminal defendants at its expense.59 The Court subsequently
extended this requirement to state trials in Gideon v. Wainwright.60
In addition to securing defendants’ right to counsel, the Court’s Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence has defined a minimum standard for counsel’s
conduct.61 In Anders v. California, the Court held that counsel must
support a defendant’s appeal to the best of her ability.62 The Anders Court
therefore ensured that counsel cannot ignore her client’s wishes in an
appellate proceeding.63 Yet in other ineffective assistance cases, the
Supreme Court overlooked protecting clients’ decision-making power.64
59. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938); see The Right to Counsel in Federal Trials in
Johnson v. Zerbst, SIXTH AMEND. CTR., https://sixthamendment.org/the-right-to-counsel/historyof-the-right-to-counsel/the-right-to-counsel-in-federal-trials/ [https://perma.cc/DH4P-K35Y] (last
visited Sept. 26, 2019) (explaining that Zerbst expanded the meaning of the Sixth Amendment from
“the court may appoint counsel . . . [to] the court must appoint counsel in criminal cases.”).
60. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 445
(1942), which denied counsel to indigent defendants in criminal trials); see Jessie Kratz, Feature
Document: A Right to a Fair Trial, NAT’L ARCHIVES: PIECES OF HIST. (Dec. 23, 2016),
https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/2016/12/23/featured-document-a-right-to-a-fair-trial/
[https://perma.cc/R2TZ-VAW8] (explaining that the impact of Gideon was “far-reaching.” Gideon
guaranteed defendants a constitutional right to counsel, compelling many states and counties to
establish a system of public defenders. “The case is considered one of the most significant Supreme
Court decisions in American history.”); see also David Carroll, A Cronic Resolve to America’s
Chronic Right to Counsel Deficiencies, SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://sixthamendment.org/a-cronic-resolve-to-americas-chronic-right-to-counsel-deficiencies/
[https://perma.cc/6Y3Y-FYH5] (noting humorously that the Supreme Court established it is
insufficient for states, in providing defendants with lawyers, to merely offer “a warm body with a
bar card to stand beside an indigent person.”).
61. See Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1162 (2012) (explaining that the Court’s ineffective assistance jurisprudence
has a “norm-shaping impact” on counsel’s conduct); see also Ethics Opinion 1048, N.Y. ST. BAR
ASS’N (Mar. 2, 2015) (noting that ineffective assistance jurisprudence shapes the lawyer’s role).
62. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see Sixth Amendment—Right to Assistance
of Counsel, ANNENBERG CLASSROOM, https://www.annenbergclassroom.org/resource/rightassistance-counsel/ [https://perma.cc/5K3P-646W] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019) (explaining that the
Anders Court found the attorney was ineffective when he merely submitted a letter to the court
stating the appeal had no merit and then withdrew from the case); see also Frederick D. Junkin,
The Right to Counsel in “Frivolous” Criminal Appeals: A Reevaluation of the Guarantees of
Anders v. California, 67 TEX. L. REV. 181, 183 (1989) (explaining that Anders established the
minimum standard of representation that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require of appellate
counsel).
63. See Junkin, supra note 62, at 183 (noting the Anders Court’s requirement that appellate
lawyers act as “active advocates” of their clients’ interests (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744)); but
see Kip Nelson, What Type of Review is Triggered by a “No-Merit” Brief?, N.C. APP. PRACTICE
BLOG (July 18, 2018), https://www.ncapb.com/2018/07/18/what-type-of-review-is-triggered-by-ano-merit-brief/ [https://perma.cc/4LJA-J8WN] (explaining that Anders allows an attorney to
withdraw from an appeal in which she finds no legal merit so long as the attorney provides an
explanatory brief).
64. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 745–46 (1983) (noting that the Barnes Court qualified
the Anders’ rule. In Barnes, the Court held that it protects a defendant’s wishes at an appellate
proceeding only if the defendant presents nonfrivolous issues on appeal. The Barnes Court made
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1. Jones v. Barnes
For instance, after Anders, the Court in Jones v. Barnes held that if a
defendant asks counsel to press issues on appeal, counsel does not need
to raise every issue, even if it is nonfrivolous.65 In Barnes, counsel listed
seven claims which he considered including in his appellate brief and
sought the defendant’s input.66 Counsel’s brief listed only three of the
seven claims, and during oral arguments, he did not address issues that
the defendant raised in his pro se briefs.67
The defendant alleged ineffective assistance, and the Second Circuit
agreed, holding that counsel must argue points the defendant raised to her
full ability.68 The court relied on Anders—reasoning that because Anders
prohibits counsel from abandoning a nonfrivolous appeal, it also
prohibits counsel from abandoning a nonfrivolous issue on appeal.69
clear that counsel thus has no obligation to present a client’s frivolous issues on appeal.); see also
David J. Gross, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments—Appointed Counsel Has No Constitutional
Duty to Argue All Nonfrivolous Issues on Appeal, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1353
(1983) (explaining that in Barnes, the Court held that attorneys have no constitutional duty to raise
every nonfrivolous issue that defendants request they argue).
65. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751; see Peter Blair, Specific Grounds on Which to Appeal: Ineffective
Assistance by Counsel, LAW OFF. OF PETER BLAIR (Aug. 13, 2015),
https://www.blairdefense.com/specific-grounds-on-which-to-appeal-ineffective-assistance-bycounsel/ [https://perma.cc/9Z9H-DNEF] (explaining that to provide effective assistance, counsel
must discuss important legal decisions with her client).
66. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 748 (explaining that the defendant sent his counsel a letter listing several
claims that he felt counsel should raise. In a return letter, counsel accepted some of the suggested
claims but rejected most of them. Counsel explained that he rejected claims which would not aid
the defendant in obtaining a new trial. Counsel then listed seven potential claims that he considered
including in his brief and invited the defendant’s “reflections and suggestions.” The record did not
indicate that the defendant responded to this letter.); see generally Karen A. Krisher, Jones v.
Barnes, the Sixth, and the Fourteenth Amendments: Whose Appeal Is It, Anyway?, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
163, 185–88 (1986) (explaining the facts of Barnes in detail).
67. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 748 (noting that counsel submitted the defendant’s pro se brief.
Afterward, the defendant filed two more pro se briefs which raised three of the issues counsel had
not included in his brief.); see Krisher, supra note 66, at 185 (detailing that counsel explained to
the defendant via letter that the defendant’s proposed claims would not be helpful in winning a new
trial and could not be raised on appeal, because the claims were not based on evidence in the
record).
68. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 749 (explaining that the court of appeals established a new standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims about an attorney’s failure to raise colorable points on
appeal); see generally Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 431–32 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that the district
court dismissed the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that an
attorney is not required to argue every conceivable issue on appeal, especially when some may be
without merit. Rather, the district court held that it is counsel’s professional duty to apply her
strategic judgment in choosing only those issues with the greatest merit.).
69. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 750; see Richard N. Allman, Jones v. Barnes and the Right to Counsel
on Appeal: Is Effective Assistance of Counsel More than Faerie Gossamer?, 4 PACE L. REV. 407,
416 (1984) (explaining that the Anders Court measured the effective assistance of counsel with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s standard of fundamental fairness, rather than the Sixth Amendment’s
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The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the Second Circuit
overextended the Anders rule.70 The Court reasoned that Anders, in
ensuring counsel’s effective advocacy for her client, defies requiring
counsel to raise every claim a defendant requests.71 Thus, the Barnes
Court held that a defendant does not have a right to compel counsel to
press arguments that counsel declines to press.72 Instead, counsel
provides her best advocacy when she decides which issues to press,
independent of a defendant’s wishes.73 Although the Court affirmed that
a defendant has the ultimate authority to make certain decisions,74 it held
standard. After Anders, legal scholars encouraged courts to measure effective assistance of counsel
by the Sixth Amendment’s standards. They noted that while the Fourteenth Amendment addresses
only fairness, the Sixth Amendment focuses more directly on counsel’s quality of representation
and thus would expand client protection beyond just the notion of fairness.).
70. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750 (1983) (noting that at the appellate level, a dissenting
judge argued that the majority had overextended Anders. The judge’s position was that Anders only
determined that counsel must pursue nonfrivolous appeals and did not suggest counsel must
advance all nonfrivolous issues.); see Barnes, 665 F.2d at 436. At the appellate court, the dissenting
judge distinguished Anders—where counsel’s complete refusal to brief and argue claims left the
defendant without the aid of counsel in pressing his appeal—with Barnes, where counsel pressed
the defendant’s issues on appeal, but not all of the issues. Id. See generally Allman, supra note 69,
at 423 (noting the appellate judge’s “vigorous dissent” about applying the Anders rule to Barnes).
71. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 753–54 (explaining that requiring counsel to raise every colorable claim
would compel judges to second-guess attorneys’ reasonable, professional judgment); see Rebecca
Wilhelm,
Effective
(or
Ineffective)
Assistance
of
Counsel,
LAWYERS.COM,
https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/criminal/criminal-law-basics/effective-or-ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel.html (Apr. 9, 2015) (explaining that judges are reluctant to second-guess
attorneys’ judgment, as judges assume that lawyers know the best way to defend their clients); see
also Kelly, supra note 39 (explaining that courts are wary of undermining the criminal process by
affirming a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It would be problematic if every
time a defendant did not like her lawyer or was unhappy with the outcome, the defendant could
succeed on an ineffective assistance claim.).
72. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751. In Barnes, the Court held that counsel’s superior legal skills, as
compared to the client’s, meant that counsel does not need to advance all nonfrivolous issues.
Rather, counsel must only select the most promising issues for review. See Krisher, supra note 66,
at 189 (arguing that the Barnes Court’s rationale that a defendant is more likely to be given the best
possible representation when counsel decides which issues to press has both “strength and appeal.”
After all, trained counsel has “superior ability” as compared to the “untrained, legally inexperienced
defendant.” Therefore, counsel ought to decide which issues should be raised on appeal.); but see
Uphoff & Wood, supra note 10, at 2–3 (noting that defendants have to unfairly bear the
consequences of counsels’ strategic decisions that backfire, even though the defendant may have
had “little or no say in the decisions.”).
73. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 754 (explaining that respect for counsel’s reasonable, professional
judgment ensures that counselors meet Anders’ goal of effective advocacy); see Allman, supra note
69, at 428 (explaining that the Barnes Court, in holding that counsel need not raise all colorable
issues that a client suggests, failed to adopt a precise standard for the effective assistance of counsel
during the appellate process. The Court established what counsel does not need to do—rather than
establishing what counsel must do.).
74. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751 (explaining that a defendant possesses the ultimate authority to
decide whether or not to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify on her own behalf, or take an appeal);
see generally A.B.A., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (4th ed. 2017),
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that the Sixth Amendment does not require counsel to raise all of the
defendant’s proposed claims.75
The Barnes decision was met with limited support: Justice Brennan’s
dissenting opinion and the amicus brief from the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association (NLADA) found error in dismissing the
defendant’s ineffective assistance claim.76 Brennan critiqued the
majority’s disregard for the American Bar Association’s conception of
counsel as an advisor, which for Brennan signified that counsel advises,
but does not decide for, her client.77 He warned that Barnes would
encourage attorneys to disregard their clients’ wishes, thereby increasing
clients’ suspicion.78 Like Brennan, the NLADA concluded that tradition

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition/
[https://perma.cc/H6KR-ETSM] (explaining that counsel should allow the defendant to make the
final decision on all matters, including strategic decisions).
75. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983); see David Carroll & Phyllis Mann, Systemic
Right to Counsel Failures Cannot be Resolved in Case-by-Case Reviews, SIXTH AMEND. CTR.
(Apr. 30, 2017), https://sixthamendment.org/systemic-right-to-counsel-failures-cannot-beresolved-by-case-by-case-reviews/ [https://perma.cc/8ADC-36N9] (summarizing that the Barnes
Court held that even if a defendant’s case has nonfrivolous issues that might merit reversal on
appeal, the defendant cannot force his attorney to brief and argue those issues).
76. See Barnes, 463 U.S. at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining Brennan’s “fundamental
disagreement” with the Barnes majority over the meaning of a defendant’s right to effective
assistance of counsel. Brennan lamented that under Barnes, an attorney can refuse to raise issues
with arguable merit even when her client directed her to raise them.); see also Brief of the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4–5, Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (No. 81-1794) (arguing that the Second Circuit correctly held that
counsel must raise every nonfrivolous issue that the defendant requests, as ethical and constitutional
standards require).
77. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 759–60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility EC 7-7 (1980)) (noting that A.B.A. standards state counsel’s role is to
advise, and the decision regarding which issues to press is ultimately made by the client); compare
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT: PREAMBLE & SCOPE (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“As advisor, a
lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s legal rights and obligations
and explain their practical implications.”), with MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 2.1 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1983) (explaining that as advisor, counsel is required to “exercise independent professional
judgment”).
78. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 762 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Roy B. Flemming, Client Games:
Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their Relations with Criminal Clients, 1986 AM. BAR FOUND.
RSCH. J. 253, 258 (1986) (detailing an attorney’s experiences as a public defender. His clients
frequently considered him as “part of the court-house machinery.” His clients thought that if the
prosecutor and judge are part of the system, the defense attorney must be as well. Indigent clients
also tend to think appointed counsel would work more diligently if they retained the counsel. The
attorney noted that overcoming the defendants’ skepticism is a “very slow process” which requires
time and patience.); see also JONATHAN D. CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANT’S
PERSPECTIVE 81 (1978) (explaining that clients are suspicious of public defenders because there is
no financial exchange between them, so clients do not feel they have leverage over counsel. Second,
a client typically cannot choose appointed counsel but merely receives one. Third, the entity paying
the public defender—the government—is also paying the prosecutor and the judge, so many
defendants have “real doubts as to whether ‘their’ lawyer really belongs to them.”).
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and codes of conduct grant the defendant rather than counsel the decisionmaking power over which issues to appeal.79
2. United States v. Cronic
One year after the Barnes Court limited defendants’ success with
ineffective assistance claims, the Court in United States v. Cronic looked
to expand it—this time addressing counsel’s minimally required legal
experience and preparation.80 In Cronic, the district court appointed the
defendant a young lawyer with a real estate background and gave the
lawyer twenty-five days to prepare for trial.81 The defendant was
convicted of numerous counts of mail fraud charges, but the Tenth Circuit
reversed the conviction after concluding counsel provided ineffective
assistance.82 In so concluding, the court did not rely on proof of counsel’s
errors or his failure to act reasonably.83 Rather, a defendant need not
supply proof of counsel’s ineffective conduct but only proof that
circumstances interfered with counsel’s preparation, the Tenth Circuit
held.84
79. Brief of the Nat’l Legal Aid and Def. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8,
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (No. 81-1794) (“Conversely, the client is traditionally granted
decision-making authority in matters that more obviously affect the outcome of the case.” (quoting
ANNOTATED CODE OF PRO. RESP. DR 7-101 cmt. (AM. BAR FOUND. 1979))); but see Uphoff &
Wood, supra note 10, at 5 (“[E]xamines how the Constitution and professional norms encourage,
but do not mandate, lawyer dominance over most decision-making issues.”).
80. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 649 (1984); see generally Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d
619, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2011). In Muniz, the court looked to Cronic to determine whether counsel
sleeping during the defendant’s cross-examination was sufficient to trigger a presumption of
prejudice.
81. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654 (explaining that, by comparison, the government spent over four
years investigating the case by reviewing thousands of documents during the investigation); see
United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 1982) (noting that the attorney’s lack of
experience with criminal law was not in the record, but the Cronic case was likely his first criminal
law experience).
82. Cronic, 675 F.2d at 1128 (explaining that the Court of Appeals did not intend to create a per
se rule whereby an attorney’s lack of relevant experience automatically gives rise to ineffective
assistance of counsel. Rather, the court held that based on the facts of this case, it could not conclude
that counsel adequately represented the defendant.); see Cronic, 466 U.S. at 655 (noting that the
court indicted the defendant and two co-defendants on mail fraud charges involving the transfer of
over $9,400,000 in checks during a four-month period. The co-defendants agreed to testify for the
government—allowing the court to easily convict the defendant on eleven of the thirteen counts in
the indictment. The defendant received a 25-year sentence.).
83. Cronic, 675 F.2d at 1128 (noting that other cases have established that when circumstances
hamper a lawyer’s preparation, the defendant does not need to show specified errors in counsel’s
conduct to prove ineffective assistance); see generally Stephen F. Hanlon, The Appropriate Legal
Standard Required to Prevail In a Systematic Challenge to an Indigent Defense System, 61 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 625, 627 (2017) (explaining that the court of appeals reversed the conviction based
on the circumstances surrounding counsel’s preparation without determining whether counsel’s
performance prejudiced the defense).
84. Cronic, 675 F.2d at 1128. The court of appeals found that a showing of prejudice was not

2020]

Garza v. Idaho

289

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and disagreed.85 Examining its
jurisprudence,86 the Court determined that if surrounding circumstances
sufficiently compromise counsel’s representation, a defendant succeeds
on an ineffective assistance claim without addressing counsel’s
performance.87 The Court qualified, though, that surrounding
circumstances justify a presumption of ineffective assistance only when
no attorney could provide reasonable assistance.88 Applying this rule, the
Court concluded that some attorneys could provide effective assistance
with limited experience and preparation and dismissed the defendant’s
claim.89
3. Strickland v. Washington
Later that year, in 1984, the Strickland Court refined the Cronic
holding by establishing its two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of

necessary “when circumstances hamper a given lawyer’s preparation of a defendant’s case.” In
such an instance, the court held that courts should presume prejudice. See generally Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that the government must assign counsel in a manner that is
timely and affords “effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.”).
85. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 650; see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for the Government at i, Cronic,
466 U.S. 648 (No. 82-660) (stating that the issue in Cronic was whether the court of appeals
correctly reversed the defendant’s convictions on the ground that he did not receive effective
assistance of counsel at trial).
86. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 452–53 (1940) (holding that the circumstances
surrounding the appointed counsel’s three days to prepare for trial were favorable enough to not
presume ineffective assistance. The Avery Court reasoned that counsel had easy access to the
evidence and witnesses—rendering circumstances favorable to counsel’s effective assistance and
therefore creating no presumption of ineffective assistance.); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 54 (1970) (explaining that the Court refused to fashion a per se rule of ineffective
assistance when a defendant alleges merely an untimely appointment of counsel without alleging
improper performance at trial).
87. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984); see United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133,
1145 (11th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the Supreme Court applied Cronic’s presumption of
ineffective assistance once after it decided Cronic: “[t]he scope of the Cronic exception is that
narrow; the burden of showing it applies is that heavy.”).
88. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662 (“The dispositive question in [Cronic] therefore is whether the
circumstances surrounding respondent’s representation . . . justified such a presumption [of
ineffective assistance].”); see Carroll, supra note 60 (explaining that Cronic’s ineffective assistance
test is forward-looking. If certain unfavorable factors are present or if necessary factors are absent
at the beginning of a case, a court should presume counsel’s ineffective assistance.).
89. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 665 (explaining that the circumstances—that the attorney was young,
his principal practice was in real estate, and this was his first jury trial—did not support a
presumption of ineffective assistance. The Court reasoned that every experienced criminal defense
attorney once tried her first case, and counsel’s real estate background may have served him well
in preparing for this case which concerned financial transactions.); but see Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932) (reversing the convictions and death sentences of nine defendants on the grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendants had not seen an attorney until the
morning of the trial and thus had no chance of a meaningful defense).
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counsel claims.90 The Strickland Court held that a defendant claiming
ineffective assistance must first show that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,91 viewed at the time of
her conduct,92 and measured by prevailing professional norms.93 Second,
the defendant must prove counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant’s trial, rendering it unfair and unreliable.94
90. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see Chris Schmidt, This Day in
Supreme Court History—January 10, 1984, IIT CHI.-KENT COLL. L.: ISCOTUSNOW (Jan. 10,
2017),
http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/iscotus/day-supreme-court-history-january-10-1984/
[https://perma.cc/DZ4T-NRQC] (stating that the Strickland Court established a “demanding
standard” for a defendant to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim); see Brian Gallini, Teaching
Strickland v. Washington Through the Case of Adnan Syed, THE FAC. LOUNGE (Oct. 7, 2019, 9:00
AM), https://www.thefacultylounge.org/2019/10/teaching-strickland-v-washington-through-thecase-of-adnan-syed.html [https://perma.cc/PQ6W-2XRV] (explaining that the Strickland standard
“permits almost anything to pass as constitutionally acceptable defense representation.”).
91. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88 (noting that all of the federal courts of appeals have held that
the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance (citing
Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151–52 (2d Cir. 1983)). The Court noted that the Sixth
Amendment refers simply to “counsel” and does not specify the requirements of counsel’s effective
assistance (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 100 (1955))). See Kent A. Russell & Tara
Hoveland, Habeas Hints: Understanding and Satisfying the Strickland Test for AIC, 1 CRIM.
LEGAL NEWS 18, 18 (2018) (explaining that counsel’s conduct falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness when she performs contrary to her client’s best interests in a way that a reasonable
lawyer would not).
92. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (noting that an intrusive, post-trial inquiry into a counsel’s
performance improperly encourages ineffective assistance challenges); see Whitney Cawley,
Raising the Bar: How Rompilla v. Beard Represents the Court’s Increasing Efforts to Impose
Stricter Standards for Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1139, 1141 (2007)
(explaining that Strickland instructs courts to measure counsel’s performance based on counsel’s
perspective at the time of her conduct, rather than in hindsight. As a result, despite cases involving
questionable representation, lawyers are given the benefit of the doubt, and courts have reversed
few convictions on the grounds of ineffective assistance.); see also Don Weaver, The Objective
Reasonableness Standard: Glancing in the Mirror Before Criticizing Graham v. Connor, LEXIPOL
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/objective-reasonableness-standard/
[https://perma.cc/YB5E-NB7T] (noting that it is rare for a criminal trial to proceed exactly as a
party, attorney, or judge can plan or predict. “It is neither reasonable nor fair to defense counsel
to judge their performance based on hindsight, outcome, or facts not known at the time of trial.”).
93. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (noting that prevailing professional norms of practice are
reflected in American Bar Association Standards, among other sources, which serves as a guide in
determining what is reasonable); see Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Lawyering to the Lowest Common
Denominator: Strickland’s Potential for Incorporating Underfunded Norms into Legal Doctrine, 5
FAULKNER L. REV. 199, 202 (2014) (noting that analysis under Strickland’s first prong will change
in response to the underlying norms of attorney conduct, and those norms will in turn change the
law itself); see also Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515,
517 (2009) (explaining the “dramatic shift” for defense attorneys after Strickland. On account of
Strickland, the Court no longer ignores professional standards of conduct in deciding what
constitutes counsel’s constitutionally effective representation. Therefore, as a result of Strickland,
“[d]efense attorneys must, on pains of being faulted for ineffective assistance, diligently investigate
and defend their clients’ cases.”).
94. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (providing that a defendant’s case is prejudiced when counsel’s
errors were “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”);
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In Strickland, counsel decreased his efforts after learning the defendant
confessed to two of three murder charges, against counsel’s advice.95 The
court sentenced the defendant to death on all of the murder charges.96 In
response, the defendant claimed ineffective assistance because of
counsel’s reduced involvement during the sentence proceeding.97
For the first prong of its test, the Strickland Court held that counsel
made strategic decisions within the range of professional responsibility,
thus meeting the Court’s standard of reasonableness.98 With the second
prong, the Court held that the defendant did not prove counsel’s failure

see Erin A. Conway, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: How Illinois Has Used the “Prejudice”
Prong of Strickland to Lower the Floor on Performance When Defendants Plead Guilty, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. 1707, 1717 (2011) (explaining that Strickland’s first prong is objective and its second
prong is subjective); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–94 (choosing against an outcomedeterminative standard that would require the defendant to show that counsel’s deficient conduct
more likely than not altered the outcome of the proceeding. The Court determined that this
outcome-determinative standard places too high a burden of proof for defendants.); but see Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1985). In Lockhart, the defendant claimed his guilty plea was
involuntary because counsel provided ineffective assistance by supplying erroneous information
about the consequences of the guilty plea. The Supreme Court applied the two-pronged Strickland
test. Id. at 58. But modifying Strickland’s second prong, the Lockhart Court required a higher
burden of proof: that the defendant show but for counsel’s deficient performance, he would have
gone to trial rather than plead guilty. Id. at 59–60.
95. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (explaining that counsel actively
pursued pretrial motions and discovery at first. Counsel, however, hopelessly minimized his efforts
when he learned that the defendant confessed to the first two murder charges.); see Smith, supra
note 93, at 538 n.84 (arguing that the Strickland majority “refused to accept” the attorney’s
admission of hopelessness and instead concluded that counsel made strategic choices for the
client’s case).
96. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675. The defendant waived his right to a jury trial—acting once
again against counsel’s advice—and plead guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder
charges. Id. at 672. See Elianna Spitzer, Strickland v. Washington: Supreme Court Case,
Arguments, Impact, THOUGHTCO., https://www.thoughtco.com/strickland-v-washington-4768693
[https://perma.cc/SMN9-BJDD] (Oct. 5, 2019) (explaining that at the plea hearing, the defendant
told the judge he committed the burglaries, which escalated to more serious crimes, while under
financial stress).
97. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675 (noting that the defendant challenged counsel’s assistance on
six different counts. The defendant asserted that counsel was ineffective because he failed to: (1)
move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, (2) request a psychiatric report, (3) investigate
and present character witnesses, (4) seek a pre-sentence investigation report, (5) present meaningful
arguments to the sentencing judge, and (6) investigate the medical examiner’s reports or crossexamine the medical experts.); see Robert Uzdavines, The “Not So Supreme” Court: State Law
Dictates Supreme Court Decision in Chaidez, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 39, 44 (2014) (explaining that
when counsel made the decisions that were under review, he was motivated to prevent the State
from cross-examining his client and from presenting psychiatric evidence against the client).
98. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699 (explaining that despite counsel’s understandable feelings of
hopelessness after the defendant confessed to two of the murders, the record did not indicate that
counsel’s professional judgment was distorted); but see Respondent's Brief in Opposition at *2,
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (No. 82-1554) (noting that the district court established the “basic,
historical fact” that counsel “ceased any serious preparation or investigation” after being
“immobilized by a hopeless feeling” about the defendant’s case).
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to enter evidence99 harmed his sentencing, which failed to satisfy the
second prong.100 In so holding, the Strickland Court established the
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims.101
4. Roe v. Flores-Ortega
In 2000, the Court in Roe v. Flores-Ortega further defined the
Strickland standard and honed the Cronic Court’s presumption of
ineffective assistance.102 The Cronic Court established that if
unfavorable circumstances surrounded counsel’s representation, courts
should presume counsel’s assistance was ineffective—enabling
defendants to automatically succeed on an ineffective assistance claim.103
The Flores-Ortega Court, however, limited its presumption to only
Strickland’s second prong, still requiring defendants to prove the first
99. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699–700. The defendant claimed that counsel should have offered
evidence of the defendant’s purported extreme emotional disturbance at the sentencing hearing as
a mitigating factor. Id. at 675–76. See Susan K. VanBuren, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Quandry [sic]: The Debate Continues – Strickland v. Washington 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), 18
AKRON L. REV. 325, 326 (1984) (explaining that the Strickland defendant testified at trial that his
family’s financial struggle while he was unemployed incited his brief criminal behavior); see also
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(b) (1975); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(f) (1975). The two statutory
mitigating circumstances which the Strickland counsel would have had to establish are: (1) that the
capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance and (2) that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.
100. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699–700. The Court found that counsel was justified in not entering
the evidence of the defendant’s psychological state because his mental state did not to rise to the
level of extreme disturbance. Id. Rather, the Court noted that counsel’s admission of the evidence
could have instead harmed the defendant’s case, because the defendant’s benign psychological
reports would have directly contradicted his claim of extreme emotional disturbance. Id. at 700; see
generally Spitzer, supra note 96 (explaining that the State executed the Strickland defendant two
months after the Strickland Court handed down its decision).
101. See EMILY M. WEST, INNOCENCE PROJECT, COURT FINDINGS OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS IN POST‐CONVICTION APPEALS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA
EXONERATION CASES 1 (2010) (arguing that the Strickland Court created an “extremely high
burden” for defendants to establish ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 427 (1996) (explaining
that the Strickland standard created a presumption that counsel was competent and placed the
burden of showing prejudice upon the defendant).
102. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (holding that the Strickland standard
applies to claims that counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to file a notice of appeal);
see also Douglas Ankney, SCOTUS: Presumption of Prejudice Recognized in Flores-Ortega
Applies Regardless of Defendant’s Appeal Waiver, 2 CRIM. LEGAL NEWS 16, 16 (2019) (explaining
that the Flores-Ortega presumption applies only in automatically satisfying Strickland’s second
prong—requiring that the defendant prove Strickland’s first prong).
103. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984) (describing that the question in Cronic
was whether the surrounding circumstances justified the presumption that counsel provided
ineffective assistance); see Carroll, supra note 60 (explaining that the Cronic presumption of
prejudice would be met only if even the best attorney would not be able to adequately represent her
client).
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prong.104 Accordingly, it held that when counsel failed to file a notice of
appeal, courts must presume Strickland’s second prong is satisfied.105
In Flores-Ortega, the prosecutor charged the defendant with numerous
crimes,106 and the defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder.107 The
court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years to life, and the judge
informed him that he could appeal within sixty days.108 While in lockup,
the defendant could not communicate with counsel, and counsel did not
file a notice of appeal.109 As a result, the defendant alleged ineffective
assistance.110 The district court denied relief, but the Ninth Circuit relied
on precedent establishing that counsel’s failure to file without the

104. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483 (explaining that when counsel’s conduct allegedly
denied the defendant an entire proceeding—as occurred in Flores-Ortega—courts must presume
that counsel’s performance prejudiced the trial); see also Lee, supra note 21 (noting that even if the
Garza Court applied the Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice, doing so would only satisfy
Strickland’s second prong. Garza therefore would still be required to prove Strickland’s first
prong.).
105. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484; see Erin N. Rieger, The Role of Professional
Responsibility in the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 29 N. KY. L.
REV. 397, 397 (2002) (explaining that the Flores-Ortega defendant received a life sentence in
prison, did not speak English or know the law well, and could not communicate with his lawyer).
106. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 473 (noting that the court charged the defendant with one count
of murder, two counts of assault, and personal use of a deadly weapon); see Brief for Respondent
at 1, Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (No. 98-1441) (explaining that the alleged homicide occurred
during a brawl outside of a bar).
107. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 473 (describing the California rule governing the FloresOrtega defendant’s plea whereby the defendant could deny committing a crime but also admit that
there is sufficient evidence to convict him); see Brief for Respondent, supra note 106 (explaining
that the Flores-Ortega defendant repeatedly stated that he did not commit the crime but plead guilty
because his attorney had advised him to do so); see also People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 420 (Cal.
1970) (describing the Flores-Ortega defendant’s plea agreement as one in which the defendant
knows of the violation and is prepared to admit each of its elements).
108. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 474 (2000); see Ortega v. Roe, 160 F.3d 534, 535 (9th
Cir. 1998) (noting that after the hearing, the magistrate judge found that the defendant “had little
or no understanding” of what an appeal meant or what the appeals process entailed).
109. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 474. The defendant’s counsel wrote “bring appeal papers” in
her file but did not file an appeal. Id. The defendant was in lock-up for ninety days after his
sentencing. Id. Approximately 120 days after his sentencing, the defendant filed a notice of appeal
which the court rejected because it was untimely. Id. See Rieger, supra note 105, at 397 (explaining
that the court took the defendant into custody immediately after his sentencing. The defendant could
not contact his attorney until ninety days had passed.); see also Brief for Respondent, supra note
106, at 2. The Flores-Ortega defendant described his time in custody as: “They just take you out
to bathe, and they just lock you back up in your cell. You can’t make a phone call, you’re
completely locked up.”
110. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 476 (noting that the Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
in the lower courts on counsel’s obligations to file a notice of appeal); see CONG. RES. SERV., RL
33391, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: A BRIEF LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2010) (explaining that federal
habeas corpus is a procedure in which a federal court can review the legality of an individual’s
incarceration).
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defendant’s consent constituted ineffective assistance111 and remanded
the case to the district court.112 Because the lower courts disagreed on
counsel’s obligation to file a notice of appeal, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.113
Applying the Strickland standard,114 the Flores-Ortega Court held that
counsel’s failure to consult with the defendant about an appeal fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness, satisfying Strickland’s first
prong.115 For the second prong,116 the Court examined precedent stating
it is met if counsel denied the defendant her services at a critical stage.117
Counsel denied the defendant more than just her services at a critical
stage, the Court reasoned, but rather denied the defendant an entire

111. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 475–76 (explaining that the magistrate judge and district court
acknowledged that precedent required only that the defendant show she did not consent to counsel’s
failure to file a notice of appeal to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim. This rule, however,
was established after the Flores-Ortega defendant filed his ineffective assistance claim. The
magistrate judge and court therefore concluded that this precedent could not be applied
retroactively to the Flores-Ortega defendant. The court of appeals, though, reversed, reasoning that
the rule mirrored a case which predated the Flores-Ortega defendant’s filing—and therefore
counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal without Flores-Ortega’s consent warranted relief.); see
generally United States v. Stearns, 68 F.3d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining how the defendant
pled guilty, the court sentenced the defendant, and the defendant allegedly wanted to appeal. The
defendant claimed he did not consent to counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal. If so, the court
of appeals concluded that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.).
112. Ortega v. Roe, 160 F.3d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1998). The court of appeals instructed the
district court to issue a conditional writ releasing the defendant from custody unless the trial court
vacated the defendant’s conviction and allowed a new appeal. Id.
113. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 476; compare United States v. Tajeddini, 945 F.2d 458, 468
(1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that counsel provides deficient assistance if he fails to file a
notice of appeal without the defendant’s knowledge or consent), abrogated by Roe v. FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), with Morales v. United States, 143 F.3d 94, 97 (2nd Cir. 1998)
(holding that counsel provides deficient assistance if he failed to file a notice of appeal only if the
defendant requested an appeal).
114. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480–81. The Flores-Ortega majority disagreed with Justice
Souter’s dissent in Flores-Ortega as to why the Strickland Court rejected per se rules for counsel’s
conduct. Id. at 481. The majority reasoned it has consistently avoided imposing mechanical rules
on counsel—even when those rules may lead to better legal representation—because the Sixth
Amendment guarantees that criminal defendants receive a fair trial but does not guarantee the
quality of legal representation. Id. Justice Souter, however, argued that Strickland rejected per se
rules out of respect for lawyers’ reasonable, strategic choices. Id. at 491.
115. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481. The Court expected that other courts would conclude in
the majority of cases that counsel had a duty to consult with his client about the appeal. Id. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (noting that the relevant question is whether
counsel’s choices were reasonable based on current professional norms).
116. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (requiring proof that counsel’s errors were so significant that
counsel deprived the defendant of a fair trial).
117. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659
(1984)); see generally Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 (“The presumption that counsel’s assistance is
essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical
stage.”); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88–89 (1988) (holding that the complete denial of counsel
on appeal requires a presumption of prejudice).
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judicial proceeding—an appeal—which thus warranted a presumption to
satisfy the second prong.118
As such, the Flores-Ortega Court established that a presumption of
prejudice automatically satisfies Strickland’s second prong when counsel
failed to file a notice of appeal.119 It did not rule on whether the
presumption applies when a defendant agreed to an appeal waiver,
however.120 The Supreme Court’s silence on the issue of appeal waivers
in such a context resulted in a split of authority, which prompted the Court
to hear Garza v. Idaho.121
II. GARZA V. IDAHO
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Gilberto Garza in Garza v.
Idaho from the Supreme Court of Idaho—an appeal of the court’s denial
of relief on Garza’s ineffective assistance claim.122 This part proceeds
with a summary of the facts and procedural history of Garza’s case
followed by a discussion of the majority opinion and Justice Thomas’s
dissent.123

118. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483–84 (describing this forfeiture of a judicial procedure as
“unusual” because counsel’s performance led not to a questionably judicial proceeding but rather
to the forfeiture of a proceeding altogether. The Court reasoned that presuming prejudice was in
line with its precedent that presumed prejudice when counsel rendered the proceeding either
presumptively unreliable or nonexistent.); see generally Brief for Respondent, supra note 106, at
21. The defendant argued that requiring him to prove prejudice would be an “onerous burden.”
119. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 486; see Lee, supra note 18 (noting that after Flores-Ortega,
courts presume prejudice when counsel failed to file a notice of appeal after the client’s appeal
request).
120. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 742 (2019) (acknowledging that Flores-Ortega defendant
did not sign an appeal waiver, as the Garza defendant had).
121. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 743 (noting that, for example, eight of the ten federal courts of appeals
have applied Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice when a defendant signed an appeal waiver);
see Clay Wild, October 2018 Preview: Garza v. Idaho, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (Sept. 29, 2018),
https://www.gwlr.org/october-2018-preview-garza-v-idaho/
[https://perma.cc/Q7WP-B9CT]
(describing that Garza would resolve a “lopsided” circuit split); see also Plea Waivers and
Ineffectiveness of Counsel for Failing to Appeal Come to SCOTUS in Garza v. Idaho, SENT’G L. &
POL. (Oct. 30, 2018, 1:22 AM), (https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/
2018/10/plea-waivers-and-ineffectiveness-of-counsel-for-failing-to-appeal-come-to-scotus-ingarza-v-idaho.html) [https://perma.cc/AC95-U4WS] (explaining that the sharp increase in plea
bargains in the past few decades, coupled with the inclusion of appeal waivers in plea bargains, led
the Supreme Court to Garza).
122. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 743; see Lee, supra note 21 (describing that Flores-Ortega, which the
Court decided nearly two decades prior, did not involve an appeal waiver. Garza therefore gave the
Court an opportunity to address an ineffective assistance claim when counsel failed to file a notice
of appeal, but the defendant agreed to an appeal waiver.).
123. See supra Section I.A (explaining plea bargains, appeal waivers, and appellate
proceedings); infra Section I.B (discussing Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel
claims).
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A. Facts and Procedural History in the Lower Courts
In 2015, Gilberto Garza signed two plea agreements arising from
Idaho’s charges of aggravated assault and possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver.124 Both plea agreements included a
clause stating Garza “waive[d] his right to appeal.”125 The court
sentenced Garza to ten years in prison, and Garza informed counsel that
he wished to appeal;126 counsel did not file a notice of appeal.127 Counsel
informed Garza that appealing would be problematic because he had
waived his right to appeal through the appeal waivers.128 Dissatisfied,
Garza sought post-conviction relief in Idaho state court, claiming
ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to file a notice.129

124. See Garza v. State, No. 44015/ 44016, 2017 WL 444026 at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. 2017)
(noting Garza had entered an Alford plea to aggravated assault pursuant to Idaho law); see also
Charles Montaldo, What Is an Alford Plea?, THOUGHTCO., https://www.thoughtco.com/what-isan-alford-plea-971381[https://perma.cc/8JZB-Y9GH] (Mar. 17, 2019) (explaining that with an
Alford plea, the defendant asserts innocence but admits that sufficient evidence exists for the
prosecution to convince a judge or jury to find the defendant guilty. If a defendant accepts an Alford
plea, the court may pronounce her guilty and impose sentencing as if the defendant had been
convicted of the crime.).
125. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 742. The Court recognized that the record suggested Garza may have
been confused about whether he had in fact waived his right to appeal. Id. at 743 n.1. Garza
answered “No” on a court form asking whether he had waived his right to appeal his conviction
and sentencing as part of his plea bargain. Id. See Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, A Truly Unusual
Coalition: Predicting Garza v. Idaho, SCOTUS OA (Feb. 11, 2019), https://scotusoa.com/garza/
[https://perma.cc/7WZA-BBRN] (noting that almost everyone at the Garza oral argument
acknowledged that there are some rights that are unwaivable. For example, a plea waiver could not
prevent an appeal for gross prosecutorial misconduct.).
126. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 743 (noting that Garza attested that he “continuously reminded” his
attorney of his desire to appeal via phone calls and letters, and that Garza’s counsel acknowledged
in his affidavit that Garza had told him he wanted to appeal the sentencing); see Transcript of Oral
Argument at 16, Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019) (No. 17-1026). Counsel argued that when a
defendant pleads guilty and signs an appeal waiver, the defendant has an interest in finality.
Therefore, there are “few defendants” who would plead guilty, sign an appeal waiver, and then
instruct their attorney to appeal.
127. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 743; see Lee, supra note 18 (indicating that counsel did not disclose
to Garza that he did not file a notice of appeal).
128. Garza,
139
S.
Ct.
at
743;
see
Garza
v.
State,
LEAGLE,
https://www.leagle.com/decision/inidco20171107179 [https://perma.cc/S3QJ-9FHG] (last visited
Oct. 13, 2019) (explaining that in both of his plea agreements, Garza waived his right to appeal and
waived his right to request relief pursuant to Idaho criminal laws); see generally IDAHO CRIM. R.
11(f)(1)(c); IDAHO CRIM. R. 35. These state laws govern Garza’s two plea agreements. Idaho
Criminal Rule 11 provides that the prosecuting attorney establishes “a specific sentence [as] the
appropriate disposition of the case.” Idaho Criminal Rule 35 indicates that the court may correct a
sentencing only if it is illegal.
129. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 743; see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 6 (noting
Justice Ginsburg’s concern that Garza’s appeal would allow him to “keep what’s good about the
plea bargain and discard what’s not good; that is, [having] no right to appeal.”).
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The trial court denied relief, and the Idaho Court of Appeals and Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed.130 The Idaho Court of Appeals embraced the
minority approach for ineffective assistance claims, holding that courts
should not presume prejudice to satisfy Strickland’s second prong when
the defendant agreed to an appeal waiver131 and affirming the trial
court.132 Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Garza
failed to meet either prong of the Strickland standard.133 Based on policy
reasons, the court rejected the presumption of prejudice because counsel
declined to pursue an appeal that a judge would clearly deny.134
Following Garza’s denied relief, the Supreme Court granted his petition
for certiorari to answer whether Garza must prove both of Strickland’s
prongs or if the Court should apply the Flores-Ortega presumption to
satisfy the prejudice prong.135
130. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 743; see Garza v. State, No. 44015/ 44016, 2017 WL 444026 at *2–3
(Idaho Ct. App. 2017) (explaining that prior to the court’s decision, it was undecided in Idaho
whether counsel’s performance was deficient, Strickland’s first prong, in failing to file an appeal
after the defendant waived her right to appeal as part of a plea agreement).
131. See Garza, 2017 WL 444026 at *5. The Idaho Court of Appeals agreed with the minority
approach in Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Garza v. Idaho,
139 S. Ct. 738 (2019). The Court reasoned that once a defendant decides to waive her right to
appeal, she has no right to revoke such a formal decision. Garza, 2017 WL 444026 at *5. For Garza
to succeed on his ineffective assistance claim, the Idaho Court of Appeals required Garza to show
prejudice with evidence that the waiver was invalid or unenforceable, or that the claimed issues on
appeal were outside the scope of the waiver. Id. See also United States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280,
282 (7th Cir. 1995). The court dismissed the defendant’s appeal because the defendant agreed to
an appeal waiver as part of a plea bargain and thus “cannot have his cake and eat it too.”
132. Garza, 2017 WL 444026 at *5 (affirming that Garza’s counsel was not ineffective for
refusing to file a notice of appeal); see Joel Kershaw, Garza v. Idaho (In Which Justices Thomas
and Gorsuch Question the Right to Effective Court Appointed Counsel), KERSHAW, VITITOE &
JEDINAK, PLC (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.monroecountylawyers.com/blog/2019/03/garza-vidaho-in-which-justices-thomas-and-gorsuch-question-the-right-to-effective-court-appointed-c/
[https://perma.cc/3TUX-TVKT] (noting that the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
denial of Garza’s attempt to preserve his appellate rights—holding that Garza failed to show either
deficient performance or resulting prejudice, Strickland’s two-pronged requirement).
I 133. Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576, 583 (Idaho 2017). The court recognized conceivable
situations in which a defendant who waived her right to appeal as part of a plea agreement could
still seek to challenge her conviction or sentence, such as if the State sentenced her illegally or
breached the plea agreement. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court relied on the district court’s conclusion
that Garza was unable to show any nonfrivolous grounds for appeal and therefore concluded that
Garza could not show prejudice. Id.
134. Garza, 405 P.3d at 582. The court reasoned that an attorney has a duty to avoid taking
action that will cost their client the benefit of the plea bargain. Id. at 583 (citing Nunez, 546 F.3d at
455, abrogated by Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019)). The court warned that if Garza’s counsel
had filed an appeal, the State could have disregarded the plea in its entirety as a result of the
defendant’s breach of the agreement. Id. But see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 126, at
11 (explaining that it is understandable for a defendant to want to rescind a plea bargain, as nothing
prohibits a defendant from rescinding a contract).
135. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 743 (2019); see Garza v. Idaho, UNC SCH. OF GOV’T,
https://www.sog.unc.edu/sccc/cases/garza-v-idaho [https://perma.cc/9NX2-LRK5] (last visited
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B. The Court’s Opinion
The Garza Court clarified Flores-Ortega’s application136: Justice
Sotomayor’s opinion for the majority held that “the presumption of
prejudice recognized in Flores-Ortega applies regardless of whether the
defendant has signed an appeal waiver.”137
Recalling its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court noted that
under Strickland, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel
must show: (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and (2) counsel prejudiced the defendant’s case.138 The
Cronic Court established that courts must presume ineffective assistance
entirely when unfavorable circumstances surrounded counsel’s
representation, independent of counsel’s performance.139 In turn, FloresOrtega refined Cronic by applying the presumption to only Strickland’s
second prong, still easing defendants’ burden of proof.140 The Court in
Garza continued this trajectory of easing defendants’ burdens by
extending the Flores-Ortega presumption to plea bargains with an appeal
waiver.141

Oct. 17, 2019) (noting that the “crux of the case” in Garza was whether the Flores-Ortega
presumption of prejudice applied despite the appeal waiver).
136. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 742; see Melissa Davlin, US Supreme Court Sides With Inmate on
Appeals Case, Overturning Idaho Court’s Ruling, IDAHO STATESMAN (Feb. 28, 2019, 12:20 PM),
https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/local/crime/article226927649.html
[https://perma.cc/QNR3-R3EL] (noting that Garza gave more clarity on the standard for waiving
certain rights in court).
137. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 742; see Greg Mermelstein, Garza v. Idaho: SCOTUS Recap, NAT’L
ASS’N
FOR
PUB.
DEF.
(May
7,
2019,
2:38
PM),
https://www.publicdefenders.us/blog_home.asp?display=769
[https://perma.cc/Q5MX-UZBZ]
(explaining that the Garza Court, in a 6–3 opinion, held that the defendant did not need to prove
prejudice as the Court would presume it).
138. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see WEST, supra note 101 (noting
that Strickland was a landmark case which established the standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel claims).
139. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984); see generally Samantha Jaffe, “It’s Not
You, It’s Your Caseload”: Using Cronic to Solve Indigent Defense Underfunding, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1465, 1474 (2018) (explaining that the question in Cronic dealt with the adequacy of defense
counsel’s trial preparation).
140. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483–84 (2000) (noting that with a presumption of
prejudice, the defendant does not need to prove the merits of his underlying claims for appeal); see
Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 742 (explaining that Garza asked whether the Flores-Ortega rule applies even
when the defendant signed an appeal waiver).
141. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744 (2019); see Scott H. Greenfield, An Appeal to Nowhere,
SIMPLE JUST. (Feb. 28, 2019), https://blog.simplejustice.us/2019/02/28/an-appeal-to-nowhere/
[https://perma.cc/4NDN-ACXR] (explaining that the Garza Court extended the rule of FloresOrtega).
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The majority explained that Garza hinges on two procedural devices,
appeal waivers and notices of appeal.142 First, an appeal waiver never
bars all appellate claims but bars only claims within its scope.143
Highlighting the modern trend of protecting defendants’ right to appeal,
the Court noted that nearly every state provides criminal defendants a
right to appeal either by statute or court rule.144 Additionally, it explained
that plea bargains are essentially contracts and, like contracts, enable
defendants to bring many claims on appeal.145 The Court therefore
reasoned that all jurisdictions regard at least some claims on appeal as
nonwaivable, such as the right to challenge the appeal waiver’s validity
because a defendant executed it unknowingly or involuntarily.146 Second,
the Court described that filing a notice of appeal requires minimal

142. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 744. The Court found it helpful to first address appeal waivers and
notices of appeal in analyzing Garza’s case. Id. See Transcript for Oral Argument, supra note 126,
at 35 (arguing that Garza’s plea bargain entailed a waiver of a procedure rather than a waiver of
issues).
143. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 744 (explaining that appeal waivers improperly suggest a “monolithic
end to all appellate rights.”); see McCue, supra note 15 (noting that even the district court advised
Garza of his rights to appeal and to be appointed counsel if he appealed).
144. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 744 n.4; see Deanna Paul, A Proposed Law Would Block Criminal
Defendants From Giving Up Rights They Could Gain in the Future, WASH. POST (July 2, 2019,
3:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/07/02/new-law-would-block-criminaldefendants-giving-up-rights-they-could-gain-future/ [https://perma.cc/76U5-2RXE] (noting the
national trend aimed at reducing defendants’ incarceration, such as by ensuring a defendant’s right
to appeal a sentencing); see also Celestine Richards McConville, Protecting the Right to Effective
Assistance of Capital Postconviction Counsel: The Scope of the Constitutional Obligation to
Monitor Counselor Performance, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 521, 531 (2005) (explaining that the appeal
process is essential to the reliability of the criminal trial process and the protection of criminal
defendants’ constitutional rights).
145. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 744. A defendant who signed an appeal waiver and directs counsel to
file an appeal “does not . . . necessarily undertake a quixotic or frivolous quest.” Id. at 745. See
generally Brief of the Idaho Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. & the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6–10, Garza, 139 S. Ct. 738 (No. 17-1026) (collecting
examples of appeal waivers allowing challenges to a sentence or conviction or allowing claims
based on prosecutorial misconduct or changes in law).
146. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 745; see United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that the defendant did not waive his right to appeal a sentencing based on an arguably
unconstitutional use of his naturalized status); United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir.
1992) (acknowledging that the defendant did not waive his right to appeal a sentencing which
exceeded the statutory maximum); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 5 (“All
the parties before the Court agree that, even though Mr. Garza signed an appeal waiver, that certain
fundamental claims survive that appeal waiver.”); id. at 68 (“Mr. Garza here has a very colorable,
I think meritorious claim, that his appeal waiver was involuntary.” For example, Garza indicated
on a form that he was not waiving his right to appeal. Additionally, no one at his plea hearings
inquired about whether Garza was waiving his right to appeal, as required under Idaho law. People
also informed Garza on three instances, once in the hearing and twice in judgments, that he had a
right to appeal after agreeing to the plea bargain.).
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effort,147 given the notice’s content is generally nonsubstantive.148
Because counsel is not taxed in filing it, the Court concluded that only
the defendant should dictate if counsel files.149
Applying the Strickland standard, the Court held that counsel provided
deficient performance by not filing a notice after Garza’s appeal request,
satisfying the first prong of unreasonableness.150 The Court relied on
Flores-Ortega, in which it held that a lawyer who disregarded her client’s
instruction to appeal acted unreasonably.151 It dismissed Idaho’s
argument that counsel strategically avoided breaching Garza’s plea
bargain, thus providing reasonable assistance.152 Counsel does not breach
a plea bargain in filing a notice of appeal, the Court explained, so counsel
was not strategic in declining to file.153 As such, the Court held that
147. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 745 (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 474 (2000)); see
Patricia M. Weaver, Noting Your Appeal Isn’t Always So Simple, LEGAL TIMES (Feb. 19, 2007),
(explaining that counsel’s responsibility to file a notice of appeal is “generally a simple ministerial
act of informing the court that you intend to appeal and providing basic related information.”).
148. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 745 (explaining that filing requirements for a notice of appeal reflect
that claims are likely to be ill-defined or unknown at the time the filing notice is due. The defendant
will likely not have important documents, such as transcripts, from the trial court. Further,
defendants may receive new counsel for their appeals; thus, the lawyer responsible for the claims
on appeal may not even be involved in the case at the time the notice of appeal is due.); see IDAHO
APP. R. 17(a)–(h) (explaining the contents of a notice of appeal under Idaho law. A notice of appeal
must contain simple statements such as the title of the action, title of the lower court, case number,
parties, the judgment or order being appealed, and a preliminary statement of the issues the
appellant is appealing, among other things.).
149. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 746; see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (recognizing that
“[t]he accused has the ultimate authority” to decide whether or not to take an appeal).
150. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 746; see Evan Lee, Argument Analysis: Court Skeptical That a Lawyer
May Unilaterally Countermand Client’s Instruction to File a Criminal Appeal, SCOTUSBLOG
(Oct. 31, 2018, 11:41 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/argument-analysis-courtskeptical-that-a-lawyer-may-unilaterally-countermand-clients-instruction-to-file-a-criminalappeal/ [https://perma.cc/V8H8-49EF] (explaining that the application of Strickland to Garza’s
case generates two questions. First, did Garza’s lawyer provide deficient performance by refusing
to file a notice of appeal, despite Garza’s repeated requests? Second, must Garza demonstrate
prejudice, or should the Court apply the presumption of prejudice adopted in Roe v. FloresOrtega?).
151. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 746. The Court concluded that counsel rendered deficient performance
by not filing a notice of appeal despite Garza’s clear requests. Id. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at
477 (explaining that counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal cannot be considered a strategic
decision. Filing a notice of appeal is a purely ministerial task, and a failure to file reflects inattention
to or disregard for the defendant’s wishes.).
152. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 746. Idaho relied on Strickland to argue that counsel’s strategic choices
made after a thorough investigation are virtually unchallengeable (citing to Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)). See Brief for Respondent at 17, Garza v. Idaho 139 S. Ct.
738 (2019) (No. 17-1026) (arguing that counsel’s act of filing or not filing a notice of appeal
requested by a client is a strategic decision for counsel. After all, filing a notice of appeal requires
counsel to analyze legal issues related to whether or not to appeal despite a waiver—which is
“squarely within the wide range of professional assistance provided by counsel.”).
153. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 746 (explaining that a defendant’s appeal could raise claims beyond
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counsel’s failure to file the notice satisfied Strickland’s first prong as
unreasonable performance.154
Turning to Strickland’s second prong, the Court held that Garza
required Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice.155 It reasoned that
Garza factually matched Flores-Ortega: in both, counsel deprived the
defendant of a desired appeal.156 Garza’s appeal waiver did not
complicate applying Flores-Ortega’s presumption.157 After all, the
Garza appeal waiver was comparable to the Flores-Ortega guilty plea
because both reduced the scope of potentially appealable issues; hence,
Flores-Ortega could control.158 The Court’s precedent also required a
presumption of prejudice when counsel forfeited an appellate proceeding,

the appeal waiver’s scope, in which case filing a notice of appeal would not breach the plea
bargain); see Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 470, 477 (2000) (concluding that counsel’s
disregard for his client’s choice to appeal cannot be considered a strategic decision)); but see Brief
for Respondent, supra note 152, at 18 (arguing that Garza could secure an appeal only by showing
that an issue for appeal was outside the scope of the appeal waiver. Counsel’s assessment of what
claims were outside of Garza’s appeal waiver was well within counsel’s normal representation.
Therefore, Garza’s counsel made a strategic decision in not filing a notice of appeal.).
154. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 745 (emphasizing that the decision of whether to appeal is the
defendant’s, not counsel’s, to make); see also id. at 746 (disagreeing with the Idaho Supreme Court
that the risk of breaching the defendant’s plea agreement renders counsel’s decision strategic.
Because filing a notice of appeal does not necessarily breach a plea agreement, it is possible that
the defendant would raise claims on appeal beyond the waiver’s scope. The Court disagreed with
its dicta in Strickland that “[counsel’s] [s]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law
and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . .” by stating “[t]hat is not
so.” (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)); see generally Buck Files, Another
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Case and a Dissent by Justice Thomas, 48 VOICE FOR THE DEF.
1, 12 (2019) (“In every case, state or federal, a lawyer representing a defendant in a criminal case
is required to give notice of appeal if the client requests it—even if the court has followed a plea
recommendation and the defendant has signed a waiver of appeal.”).
155. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 747 (explaining that the Court should apply Flores-Ortega because
both Flores-Ortega and Garza involved a lawyer who forfeited an appellate proceeding by failing
to file a notice of appeal); see Brief for Petitioner at 14, Garza, 139 S. Ct. 738 (No. 17-1026) (noting
that both Flores-Ortega’s language and logic make clear that the Court should apply the FloresOrtega presumption of prejudice when a defendant has entered a plea containing an appeal waiver).
156. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 747; see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 55 (“What
Flores-Ortega tells us is that once you know that the reason that the defendant lost out on an
appellate proceeding to which he had a right, because of what counsel did, that automatically is
prejudicial. You don’t have to know whether he was going to win his appeal.”).
157. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 747 (supporting the Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice because
Flores-Ortega, like Garza, involved a lawyer who forfeited an appellate proceeding by failing to
file a notice of appeal); see generally Jacobi & Sag, supra note 125 (explaining that the central
issue in Garza was the correct application of Flores-Ortega).
158. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 747 (emphasizing that Garza retained a right to his appeal after his
appeal waiver. Garza simply had fewer possible claims on appeal than other appellants.); but see
John O. McGinnis, How Thomas and Gorsuch Preserve the Generative Power of Originalism, LAW
& LIBERTY (Mar. 1, 2019), https://lawliberty.org/how-thomas-and-gorsuch-preserve-thegenerative-power-of-originalism/ [https://perma.cc/A3YP-AE9B] (arguing that the Court
incorrectly relied on Flores-Ortega because in Garza, the defendant waived his right to appeal in
return for the promise of a lighter sentence).
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as Garza experienced.159 Accordingly, the Court held that FloresOrtega’s presumption applied.160
The Court emphasized that Garza retained the right to appeal despite
his appeal waivers.161 Garza did not need to prove that his appeal had
merit for the Flores-Ortega presumption to apply.162 In fact, requiring
Garza to demonstrate the merit of his appeal would create a pleading
barrier that other appellants do not face and which Flores-Ortega, in
reducing defendants’ burdens, defied.163 Finding both prongs of the
Strickland standard met, the Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Idaho and remanded for further proceedings.164
C. Justice Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch in whole and Justice Alito
as to Parts I and II, dissented, arguing that the majority’s decision had no
basis in either Flores-Ortega and other ineffective assistance precedents
or the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment.165 Thomas warned that
159. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 747 (explaining that the Court will not soften the presumption of
prejudice rule merely because a defendant seems to have a low chance of success on appeal); see
generally Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000).
160. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 747.
161. Id. at 748 (explaining that Garza merely had fewer possible claims on appeal than other
appellants because of his appeal waiver); but see Brief for Respondent, supra note 152, at 9
(emphasizing that the conditions precedent to the Court determining counsel forfeited an appeal
were missing. The first condition is that the client wanted the appeal. The second condition is that
the client had a right to the appeal. Here, Garza did not have a right to appeal his sentencing, because
he lost that right through his appeal waiver. It was therefore impossible for Garza’s counsel to
forfeit an appeal of his sentencing when Garza relinquished the right to that appeal in the first
place.).
162. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 748 (refuting the government’s argument that a presumption of
prejudice is contingent on the defendant showing that her appeal had merit); see Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 155, at 22 (explaining that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when a defendant
is denied a proceeding altogether, as Garza was, a presumption of prejudice does not turn on the
merits of the claims the defendant would have brought).
163. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 748; see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 2 (explaining that
when courts did not apply Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice to cases similar to Garza’s,
defendants had to demonstrate the merits of the claims they would have brought had counsel
followed the instructions to appeal).
164. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 749–50; see Supreme Court Case Quick Updates: 2019 Term, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/resources/case_updates/
[https://perma.cc/J43E-ZBBL] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019) (explaining that the Garza Court reversed
and remanded the decision of the Supreme Court of Idaho).
165. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 750 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Jules Epstein,
There is No Constitutional Right to Effective Counsel?, TEMP. U. BEASLEY SCH. OF L.,
https://www2.law.temple.edu/aer/there-is-no-constitutional-right-to-effective-counsel/
[https://perma.cc/84BE-TVSS] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (explaining that Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch argued that “based on the historic origins of the Sixth Amendment, the right to counsel
was only the right to have some lawyer be present and not an enforceable right to effective
representation.”); see also McGinnis, supra note 158 (noting the interplay between the original
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the majority’s holding allowed a defendant’s interest in appealing to
“undo all sworn attestations to the contrary and resurrect waived statutory
rights.”166
Thomas maintained that, to meet Strickland’s second prong, a
defendant who agreed to an appeal waiver must prove counsel prejudiced
her case rather than have a court apply the presumption of prejudice.167
He reasoned that the majority’s reliance on Flores-Ortega undermined,
rather than strengthened, its argument.168 Under Flores-Ortega,
meaning of the Constitutional provision and precedent interpreting it. The Supreme Court has
decided thousands of cases about the Constitution, many with little attention to the Constitution’s
original meaning. The original meaning of the Constitutional provision can therefore disappear
down a “memory hole” replaced by the Court’s own “deathless words” which then become
precedent. As a result, the decisions of the Court can move farther and farther away from the
original meaning of the Constitution because “interpretation of precedent is piled on interpretation
of precedent.”); see generally Jennifer S. Freel & Jeyshree Ramachandran, Docket Check: Criminal
Cases Currently Before the U.S. Supreme Court, IN HOT PURSUIT (Crim. L. Sec. Fed. Bar Ass’n,
Arlington, Va), Spring 2019, at 7, https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/crimspring-2019-v3-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4KS-FD7R] (explaining that Justice Thomas’s dissent
received a “great deal of attention” because it questioned the Court’s entire ineffective assistance
of counsel jurisprudence).
166. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 752 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that Garza admitted the
appeal waiver was “by the book” and that he “received exactly what he bargained for in exchange
for his plea”); see Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017) (“The strong societal interest
in finality has special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Scott Lemieux, Neil Gorsuch Is No Civil Libertarian, LAW., GUNS &
MONEY (June 27, 2019, 9:19 AM), http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2019/06/neilgorsuch-is-no-civil-libertarian [https://perma.cc/5HHJ-8S47] (arguing that when Justice Gorsuch
joined Justice Thomas’s dissent, Gorsuch “sought to cast aside a significant constitutional
protection for criminal defendants[.]” by resisting defendant-friendly Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence).
167. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 752 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining the three ways Justice
Thomas reasoned a defendant can show his counsel’s deficiency in failing to appeal. The defendant
can (1) identify claims she would have pursued that were outside the appeal waiver, (2) show that
the plea was involuntary or unknowing, or (3) establish that the government breached the plea
agreement.); see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18, Garza
v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019) (No. 17-1026) (arguing that when a defendant waives her right to
appeal, counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal is not “invariably prejudicial.” It therefore does
not categorically deserve Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice in satisfying Strickland’s
second prong. Rather, any error by counsel in that situation affects the defendant only if it deprived
her of a still-existent right to an appellate proceeding.); see generally Weaver v. Massachusetts,
137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2017) (explaining that in most cases, a defendant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel bears the burden of affirmatively proving that counsel’s alleged mistakes
prejudiced him).
168. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 752 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 167, at 23 (arguing that neither the logic of FloresOrtega nor any other legal or practical consideration supports the majority’s holding in Garza); see
also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 45–46 (highlighting that, generally, when the
Court applies a presumption of prejudice, the Court will reach the “correct result” in most cases. In
Garza, however, the appeal waiver would ultimately be enforced and would prevent Garza from
prevailing regardless of whether counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal.
Therefore, the presumption of prejudice would lead to an “incorrect result” on account of the appeal
waiver denying Garza an appeal.).
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counsel’s failure to consult with the defendant about an appeal was not
unreasonable in every case; thus, counsel’s failure to appeal was not
necessarily unreasonable.169 Overall, Thomas concluded that the
majority purported to follow Flores-Ortega but glossed over the most
important difference: the Flores-Ortega defendant did not agree to an
appeal waiver.170
Consequently, Thomas found Flores-Ortega inapposite because there
the proximate cause of the defendant’s inability to appeal was counsel’s
failure to file the notice, while in Garza, the proximate cause was his
agreement to the appeal waivers.171 Asserting that Flores-Ortega should
not control when a defendant waived the right to appeal, Thomas rejected
the Court’s application of the presumption of prejudice.172 And therefore,

169. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 752–53 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the Flores-Ortega
Court considered whether the defendant’s plea bargain waived appeal rights in determining the
reasonableness of counsel’s failure to consult about an appeal); see generally Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (noting Strickland’s rejection of “mechanistic rules”
governing what counsel must do. It would not be constitutionally deficient for counsel to consult
with his client about an appeal when, for example, the defendant expressed satisfaction in a twoyear sentence as part of a plea bargain and receives that sentence. If the defendant did not express
any interest in appealing and counsel concluded there are only frivolous grounds for appeal, the
Strickland Court concluded that counsel would not be professionally unreasonable in failing to
consult with the defendant about an appeal.).
170. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 753 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 167, at 18 (highlighting that the Court should have
acknowledged that it had not dispensed with the requirement that a defendant prove the alleged
loss, here an appellate proceeding, was specifically attributable to his attorney. In Flores-Ortega,
the Court required the defendant to establish a “reasonable probability” that, but for his attorney’s
allegedly deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, the defendant would have exercised
his appellate rights (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000)); see generally Kent
Scheidegger, Clients, Lawyers, and Appeals, CRIME & CONSEQUENCES BLOG (June 18, 2018, 8:33
AM),
http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/2018/06/clients-lawyers-andappeals.html [https://perma.cc/FB8K-ZMY9] (explaining that the situation in Garza is “quite
different” from Flores-Ortega because in Garza, the defendant agreed to give up his right to an
appeal though an appeal waiver. Significantly, that did not occur in Flores-Ortega.).
171. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 753 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 167, at 7 (explaining that when a defendant voluntarily
renounces rights to appellate review through a waiver, as Garza did, the lack of an appellate
proceeding cannot automatically be blamed on attorney error, as the Flores-Ortega presumption of
prejudice requires. Rather, the defendant must show that counsel’s failure to appeal, not the
defendant’s appeal waiver, denied her an appeal.).
172. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 753 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the judicial scrutiny of
counsel’s performance must be highly deferential and must focus on the reasonableness of
counsel’s conduct (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984))); see Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 46 (arguing that the Strickland standard is sufficient to “catch
those instances where there is a mistake” when counsel fails to file a notice of appeal because of
the client’s appeal waiver).
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he concluded that Garza failed to demonstrate counsel’s performance was
unreasonable and prejudicial under Strickland.173
For the first Strickland prong, Thomas argued that counsel’s decision
to not appeal was the only reasonable option.174 If counsel filed a notice
of appeal, he would have jeopardized Garza’s plea and could not have
reduced his sentencing.175 To be sure, Garza entered into Rule 11 plea
bargains,176 pleas that establish an agreed-upon sentence from which the
court cannot deviate.177 Indeed, if Garza’s counsel filed a notice of
appeal, the court may have determined Garza breached his plea bargain

173. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 753 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Charles Gallmeyer, Supreme Court
Further Defines Ineffective Counsel, JURIST (Feb. 27, 2019, 1:57 PM),
https://www.jurist.org/news/2019/02/supreme-court-further-defines-ineffective-counsel/
[https://perma.cc/6T2G-W2PG] (explaining that Justice Thomas encouraged a more “specific rule”
than Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice. Thomas argued that defendants in Garza’s situation
must show prejudice by demonstrating potential appellate claims outside the appeal waiver, such
as by showing the plea was coerced or that the government failed to follow the plea deal.).
174. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 753 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (explaining that counsel’s challenged conduct under Strickland’s first prong
must affect the reliability of the judicial process because “[a]bsent some effect of challenged
conduct on the reliability of the . . . process, the [effective counsel] guarantee is generally not
implicated.”).
175. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 753 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that counsel’s act of filing a
notice of appeal would not be favorable to Garza in any way, making it “worse than pointless” to
file); see Brief for Respondent, supra note 152, at 27 (describing the risks Garza faced if counsel
filed a notice of appeal. The prosecution could have reinstated the charges, which may have resulted
in up to a life sentence for Garza).
176. See Federal Rule 11 Plea Agreements, FED. CRIM. ATT’YS OF MICH.,
https://www.federalcriminalattorneysofmichigan.com/practice-areas/detroit-criminal-defenseresources/federal-and-state-practice-and-procedure/federal-rule-11-plea-agreements
[https://perma.cc/NJL4-GLCC] (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (explaining that most pleas are
pursuant to an agreement with the prosecutor, which is referred to as a Rule 11 plea); see also
William Young, Idaho’s Infamous “Rule 11” Plea Agreement, WILLIAM YOUNG & ASSOC. (Feb.
22,
2018),
https://www.youridattorney.com/what-is-a-rule-11-plea-agreement
[https://perma.cc/G27T-9GW2] (explaining that a Rule 11 plea agreement provides for a certain
sentence if the defendant pleads guilty. A plea under this rule binds the court to the terms of the
agreement. As such, the judge cannot add, subtract, or alter the terms of a Rule 11 agreement. This
differs from a nonbinding agreement where the parties each argue for the sentence they feel is
appropriate and the judge makes the final determination.).
177. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 754 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that Garza
sought to appeal so that his sentences would run concurrently, rather than consecutively which he
agreed to in his plea bargain. Therefore, Garza sought to appeal a matter, his sentencing, which the
district court had no discretion in changing because it was a Rule 11 plea bargain. Thus, counsel’s
act of filing a notice of appeal would have breached the Rule 11 plea bargain—thereby exposing
Garza to a more unfavorable sentencing than the court provided.); see Craig Atkinson, What is a
Rule
11
Plea
Agreement?,
ATKINSON
L.
OFF.
(July
25,
2012),
https://atkinsonlawoffices.com/general-criminal-law-topics/rule11/
[https://perma.cc/5GNU6GM5] (explaining that in a Rule 11 plea agreement, the judge does not have discretion to hand
down a different sentence than what has been agreed to by the parties. The judge may, however,
reject the plea agreement altogether, at which point the defendant would proceed to trial.).
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and sentenced him to life rather than ten years.178 As such, Thomas
concluded that counsel reasonably declined to file a notice, as filing could
have compromised Garza’s favorable sentencing.179
Addressing Strickland’s second prong, Thomas disagreed with the
majority’s presumption of prejudice.180 Garza voluntarily and knowingly
relinquished his right to appeal through the appeal waivers.181 He
therefore could not establish under Flores-Ortega that counsel caused the
forfeiture of an appeal when Garza himself forfeited the appeal.182
Thomas addressed the majority’s position that certain issues are never
waivable,183 highlighting that Garza did not seek to appeal nonwaivable
issues but rather sought to appeal his sentencing, which Thomas deemed
unappealable.184 While precedent permits only the defendant to decide
not to appeal, Garza already decided not to appeal when he agreed to the
178. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 754 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that Garza’s sentencing was
likely to increase after an appeal, especially because of the trial court’s concern that the agreedupon sentence was too lenient); see generally United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638, 640–41 (7th
Cir. 2002) (“[A] defendant’s appeal, in disregard of a promise not to do so, exposes him to steps
that can increase the sentence.”).
179. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 754 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining the different analysis under
Strickland’s first prong if Garza had informed counsel that he desired to file an appeal on an issue
that had a chance of success on appeal. But Garza simply sought a more lenient sentence, which
could not be advanced by an appeal, and thus counsel did not have a duty to file a notice of appeal.
The Constitution does not urge attorneys to irrationally follow their client’s stated desires when
doing so only “courts disaster.”); but see Clark Neily & Jay Schweikert, Garza v. Idaho, CATO
INST.
(Aug.
17,
2018),
https://www.cato.org/publications/legal-briefs/garza-v-idaho
[https://perma.cc/U8MJ-DATH] (acknowledging that if a defendant files an appeal despite an
appeal waiver, the defendant risks losing her plea bargain. It is, however, ultimately the defendant’s
choice to weigh that risk against the possible benefit of an appeal, so counsel should appeal if the
client requests it.).
180. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 754 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182. Id. See also Transcript for Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 54–55 (explaining that Garza
never contended at any stage of his post-conviction case that he did not understand the appeal
waivers when he entered his pleas); but see id. at 5 (Garza’s counsel argued that Garza’s appeal
waiver was “involuntary.”).
183. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 755 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing appellate issues which are never
waivable: (1) the voluntariness of the plea agreement and (2) a breach of the agreement by the
State); see generally Puckett v. United States, 556 U. S. 129 (2009) (noting that an appeal waiver
does not bar claims outside its scope).
184. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 755 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that without the Court’s
application of the presumption of prejudice, Garza would not have been able to satisfy Strickland’s
second prong, as he was unable to identify any issues that he preserved on appeal. Therefore, his
counsel’s conduct could not have prejudiced him when there were no preserved issues to appeal.);
see Transcript for Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 52 (noting that the district court asked Garza
which issues he wished to raise on appeal. Garza specifically limited his appeal to his sentencing.
The court noted that Garza did not raise any direct challenges to the appeal waiver.); see also id. at
57–58 (explaining the government’s argument that Flores-Ortega requires a presumption of
prejudice only when the defendant has the right to an appellate proceeding which the defendant
was denied as a result of counsel’s conduct. In Garza’s case, though, the loss of his appellate
proceeding was through his conduct of accepting the plea bargain with an appeal waiver.).
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appeal waivers.185 And thus, Thomas insisted Garza could not fault
counsel for his own decision to sign appeal waivers.186
Last, Thomas dismissed Garza’s argument against requiring him, a pro
se defendant, to identify issues he would have raised on appeal to satisfy
the prejudice prong.187 Other pro se defendants must prove both of
Strickland’s prongs, and Garza’s case did not warrant an exception.188
III. APPROPRIATELY PROTECTING CLIENT AUTONOMY
By applying the Flores-Ortega presumption, the Court in Garza
continued its trend of protecting clients’ autonomy in criminal appeals.189
This part first establishes that the Court properly followed its Sixth
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel precedents.190 Next, it
185. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 755 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Transcript for Oral Argument, supra
note 126, at 60–61. (The United States argued that Flores-Ortega’s presumption applies when
counsel’s conduct denies a client appellate review on the merits of the client’s case. Because the
court of appeals would automatically dismiss Garza’s case on account of the appeal waiver anyway,
Garza was not denied the requisite appellate review on the merits. Accordingly, Flores-Ortega’s
presumption of prejudice is inapplicable.).
186. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 755 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that, for example, a defendant
cannot waive her right against self-incrimination by testifying at her trial and then claim that her
attorney prejudiced her by not moving to strike his damaging testimony from the record. Similarly,
a defendant cannot waive her right to a jury trial and then later claim prejudice when counsel
declines to seek a mistrial on the ground that the judge found her guilty.); see also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 167, at 7 (noting that counsel’s
deficient performance must actually cause the forfeiture of the defendant’s appeal as a prerequisite
for triggering the presumption of prejudice in satisfying Strickland’s second prong (citing to and
relying on Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484–85 (2000))).
187. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 755 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (remarking that Garza’s fairness argument “rings hollow” because Garza was
represented by counsel at every stage of litigation yet failed to articulate a single nonfrivolous,
nonwaived issue that he would have raised on appeal); see Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 167, at 18 (explaining that the “usual rule” is that a
defendant bears the burden to show prejudice on an ineffective assistance claim. A defendant who
cannot prove such deprivation should therefore not be granted relief.).
189. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 742 (applying the Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice regardless
of whether the defendant signed an appeal waiver); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000)
(applying a presumption of prejudice when counsel failed to file a notice of appeal for her client);
see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984) (applying a presumption of ineffective
assistance when circumstances surrounding the trial are unfavorable to the defendant); but see
McGinnis, supra note 158 (arguing that Garza improperly extended ineffective assistance of
counsel claims beyond the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. The Garza Court should not
have extended Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice to this case.); see Brief for Respondent,
supra note 152, at 18 (explaining that the Garza Court should not expand Flores-Ortega because
Flores-Ortega is inapposite on account of the Garza notice of appeal. In Flores-Ortega, counsel’s
act of filing the notice of appeal, though unperformed, was ministerial. In Garza, however,
counsel’s act of filing the notice of appeal, though unperformed, was substantive. After all,
counsel’s act of filing the notice of appeal could have had legal ramifications because of the appeal
waiver, potentially costing Garza the benefit of the plea bargain.).
190. Infra notes 193, 198; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 152, at 28 (explaining that
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demonstrates how Garza aligned with the Court’s trend of affirming
client autonomy and rejecting paternalism.191 Ultimately, it explains how
the decision reinforced defendants’ right to appeal regardless of an appeal
waiver.192
A. Aligning with Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Court correctly applied the Flores-Ortega presumption of
prejudice to Garza’s case because the Flores-Ortega rule is categorical:
so long as counsel failed to file a notice of appeal, Flores-Ortega
controls.193 The Flores-Ortega Court held that when counsel denied the
defendant an appellate proceeding, courts should apply a presumption of
prejudice to meet Strickland’s second prong.194 Garza indeed suffered a
“forfeiture of a proceeding” under Flores-Ortega.195 Idaho law, after all,
permits a defendant who agreed to an appeal waiver to appeal whether
she entered into the plea agreement or appeal waiver voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently—a proceeding which Garza’s counsel

the lower courts, in denying Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice in Garza’s case, cannot
reconcile themselves with Supreme Court precedent. For example, the Court’s precedent
established that a defendant’s right to appeal can never be contingent on an attorney’s judgment on
whether the appeal is meritorious.); but see Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 753 (Thomas J., dissenting) (“This
[court’s] rule is neither compelled by precedent nor consistent with the use of appeal waivers in
plea bargaining.”).
191. Infra Section III.D; but see Brief for Louisiana et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 4, Garza, 139 S. Ct. 738 (No. 17-1026) (arguing that when a defendant knowingly
and intelligently waives his appellate rights, as Garza did, an appellate court should never hear his
case, as he has lost his right to appeal).
192. Infra Section III.B.
193. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 7–8 (explaining that the Flores-Ortega
presumption of prejudice applies when counsel disregarded her client’s instruction to appeal—
regardless of the particulars of the judgment or plea from which that appeal is taken); see also Brief
of the Idaho Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. & the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 145, at 4 (arguing that when attorneys fail to file a notice of
appeal, the defendants suffer the same fate, the forfeiture of an appeal, whether or not they agreed
to an appeal waiver. The same presumption of prejudice should therefore apply to both types of
defendants.); but see Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra
note 167, at 13 (explaining that even when a defendant alleges the forfeiture of a proceeding, the
Supreme Court has still required a defendant to prove that the forfeiture was specifically attributable
to her attorney as part of her ineffective assistance claim).
194. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note
155, at 16 (arguing that the Flores-Ortega rationale applies with “full force” to a defendant who
signed an appeal waiver).
195. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 746 (explaining that the defendant expressly requested an appeal, but
counsel failed to file a notice of appeal); see Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 753 (Thomas J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that Garza suffered a forfeiture of his appeal, but arguing that it was Garza’s appeal
waiver—rather than counsel’s inaction—which caused the forfeiture); see also Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. at 483 (noting that Flores-Ortega was an unusual case because counsel’s alleged deficient
performance did not lead to a judicial proceeding of uncertain reliability but rather led to the
forfeiture of an entire judicial proceeding altogether).
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denied him.196 Therefore, the Garza Court accurately applied the FloresOrtega presumption because counsel’s performance led to the forfeiture
of a proceeding, regardless of additional circumstances like an appeal
waiver.197
Similarly, the Court’s application of Flores-Ortega’s presumption
conformed with its decision in Jones v. Barnes.198 In Barnes, the Court
established that a defendant’s responsibilities do not include deciding
which issues to raise on appeal, as that is one of counsel’s
responsibilities.199 Barnes, in the context of an ineffective assistance
claim, relieves a defendant from indicating which issues she would have
raised on appeal, had counsel appealed.200 As such, the Court satisfied
196. See State v. Cope, 129 P.3d 1241, 1246 (Idaho 2006) (explaining how the district court
ensured that the defendant had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered into his plea
agreement by asking him questions on two separate occasions to that effect); State v. Murphy, 872
P.2d 719, 720 (Idaho 1994) (noting that a waiver of the defendant’s rights would be upheld only if
the entire record demonstrated that the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently);
see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 20–21 (noting that the courts of appeals as well as
the Department of Justice agree that a defendant who signed an appeal waiver still retains her right
to challenge certain aspects of the agreement).
197. See Brief of the Cato Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 21, at 3
(explaining that eight federal courts of appeals have correctly held that Flores-Ortega presents a
categorical rule: attorneys must never disregard a client’s express instructions to file a notice of
appeal); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 15 (describing Flores-Ortega’s
presumption of prejudice as “unequivocal and unconditional” and thus that it does not depend on
the particulars of a defendant’s plea bargain).
198. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 489 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(relying on Jones v. Barnes to establish that the decision to seek or forgo an appeal is for the
defendant herself, not for her lawyer); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 752 (1983). The
Barnes Court held that it is the defendant’s role to determine whether or not to appeal, but it is not
the defendant’s prerogative to decide which issues or arguments to present on appeal. But see Brief
for Louisiana et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 191, at 7 (arguing that the
Flores-Ortega Court cited to Barnes and acknowledged that a defendant cannot tell counsel not to
file an appeal and then later complain that, by following her instructions, counsel performed
deficiently. In Garza, the defendant explicitly told his attorney to not file an appeal when he signed
the appeal waiver. The Garza Court should have therefore aligned with Flores-Ortega and Barnes
by not applying the Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice.).
199. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751–52; see Jennifer Franklin, What Are Your Appellate Obligations
to Your Client Following a Guilty Verdict and Sentencing?, APP. ADVOC. BLOG (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/appellate_advocacy/2019/03/what-are-your-appellateobligations-to-your-client-following-a-guilty-verdict-and-sentencing.html [https://perma.cc/J8Y5L87G] (explaining that under Barnes, the defendant holds the authority to determine whether to
pursue an appeal, while it is counsel’s responsibility to make strategic choices about which issues
to raise on appeal); but see Brief for Respondent, supra note 152, at 19 (arguing that no one disputed
that Garza alone should have made the decision of whether or not to appeal. Garza, however, made
his decision of whether or not to appeal when he agreed to the appeal waiver—thereby deciding to
not appeal.).
200. See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 748 (2019) (requiring a defendant to show which issues
or arguments her counsel should have pressed on appeal is especially improper when it was
allegedly counsel who caused the defendant to lose her appeal. The Court therefore refused to place
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the Barnes rule by applying Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice.201
The presumption relieves a defendant from having to identify issues on
appeal she would have likely succeeded on, which Strickland’s second
prong otherwise requires.202 Thus, relying on Barnes, the Court properly
rejected the dissent’s requirement that Garza identify appealable issues to
satisfy the second prong.203
The Garza Court rightly embraced the Flores-Ortega presumption in
light of Barnes as well as Flores-Ortega’s discussion of appeal
waivers.204 In Flores-Ortega, the Court stated that an appeal waiver is a
relevant factor for whether counsel should file a notice of appeal when

a “pleading barrier” between a defendant and her opportunity to appeal, an opportunity she should
not have lost in the first place.); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 29–30 (“Pro se
defendants face formidable challenges in identifying, let alone showing the merit of, the claims
they might have raised on appeal.”); see generally Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 30 (1999)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting the “heavy burden” such a requirement would impose);
Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 330 (1969) (“Those whose education has been limited
and . . . who lack facility in the English language might have grave difficulty in making even a
summary statement of points to be raised on appeal.”).
201. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 746 (noting Barnes required that the defendant hold the ultimate
authority in deciding whether to take an appeal); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
126, at 13 (explaining that under Barnes, the attorney makes the decisions about what issues to
raise on appeal. The defendant should therefore not have to articulate what issues to raise on appeal.
In fact, in Idaho, a defendant would not even be able to access the record to articulate issues for
appeal because the record does not become available until after counsel files a notice of appeal.);
but see McGinnis, supra note 158 (arguing that even if Garza complies with ineffective assistance
precedent, it continues a line of jurisprudence that is not driven by the inner logic of the Constitution
but rather by “varying coalitions of the justices and political imperatives of the day.”).
202. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 749 (explaining that the Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice
“restores the status quo that existed before counsel’s deficient performance forfeited the appeal.”
The presumption returns the defendant to the position she sought: the court granting an appellate
proceeding after the defendant succeeds on an ineffective assistance claim.); see also Transcript for
Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 13–14 (arguing that if the Garza Court did not apply a
presumption of prejudice, a defendant with potentially limited education and limited exposure to
the legal system would shoulder the burden of proof).
203. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 748 (explaining that a defendant proceeding to an appeal does not
have to decide which arguments to press. When counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal denies a
defendant an appellate proceeding, the defendant should not have to now decide which arguments
to press to demonstrate her counsel was ineffective.); see generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note
155, at 30 (highlighting the inequity of the Court requiring Garza to prove which issues he would
have raised on appeal merely because counsel failed to file a notice of appeal); but see Brief for
Respondent, supra note 152, at 18–19 (explaining that under Idaho law, while a defendant may file
a notice of appeal after waiving her right to appeal, she is nonetheless denied an appeal on the
merits. In order to achieve an appeal on the merits, Garza would therefore have needed to show
why his appeal was not barred by the waiver, by pointing to the meritorious issues on appeal.).
204. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000) (explaining the factors which, though
not determinative, are highly relevant to determine whether counsel had a duty to consult with her
client about an appeal); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 12 (noting that both prongs
of Strickland’s standard require an inquiry into several relevant factors under Flores-Ortega. One
of those factors is whether the defendant agreed to an appeal waiver.).
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the defendant was silent about her wish to appeal.205 Importantly, the
Flores-Ortega Court did not indicate an appeal waiver is relevant under
the different circumstances of when the defendant expressed her wish to
appeal.206 The Court instead provided that when a defendant asked
counsel to appeal and counsel failed to do so, counsel’s performance was
unreasonable.207 Hence, the Garza Court properly aligned with FloresOrtega’s disregard for an appeal waiver when the defendant instructed an
appeal.208
B. Appeal Waivers Not Precluding Appeal
The Garza Court correctly secured a criminal defendant’s appeal right
regardless of whether the defendant signed an appeal waiver.209 In fact,
the Court’s jurisprudence had established that the decision to appeal is

205. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480 (explaining that even when the defendant pleads guilty,
courts must consider factors such as whether the plea agreement waived some or all of the
defendant’s right to appeal); see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 12 (noting that an appeal
waiver is a relevant factor only when counsel did not consult with her client about whether she
desired to appeal).
206. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 478 (noting that an inquiry into the presence of an appeal
waiver should occur only when counsel has failed to consult with her client about appealing a
conviction or sentencing); see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 14 (explaining that FloresOrtega made clear that when an attorney disregards her client’s instruction to appeal, the client is
entitled to the appellate proceeding she otherwise would have had).
207. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480 (citing to and relying on Rodriquez v. United States, 395
U.S. 327 (1969)); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 22 (explaining that when a
defendant is deprived of the right to appeal, a court should presume prejudice with no further
showing from the defendant of the merits of her underlying claims (citing to and relying on FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. at 485)).
208. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 485 (noting that if a defendant instructs counsel to make an
appeal and counsel fails to do so, the defendant is entitled to a new appeal without any further
showing) (relying on Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969)); see also Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 155, at 36 (“An attorney must file the notice of appeal whenever his client
instructs him to do so, full stop, regardless of the precise terms of his deal.”).
209. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 747 (2019) (explaining the Court’s holding that when
counsel’s deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that she otherwise would have
taken, the defendant has pled a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Therefore, an
inquiry into the merits of the appealable issues is not needed.); see Brief of the Idaho Ass’n of Crim.
Def. Law. & the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
145, at 21 (arguing that the Garza Court should apply the presumption of prejudice not only because
of Flores-Ortega but also because of the Court’s decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
U.S. 140 (2006). In Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court held that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate
when the “consequences” of an error are “unquantifiable and indeterminate.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
U.S. at 150. Applied to Garza, an attorney’s failure to file a notice of appeal despite the client’s
instructions satisfies Gonzalez-Lopez, regardless of whether there is an appeal waiver. After all,
when counsel refuses to file a notice of appeal, the court would have to speculate about how a
hypothetical appeal would have resulted, rendering the consequences unquantifiable and
indeterminate. The Garza Court would therefore correctly apply a presumption of prejudice under
both Gonzalez-Lopez as well as Flores-Ortega.).
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fundamentally the defendant’s.210 Consequently, the Garza Court
accorded with its protection of the defendant’s—and only the
defendant’s—right to decide to appeal.211 Indeed, in Flores-Ortega, the
Court began its analysis with the principle that only the defendant owns
the decision to appeal.212 And even if a defendant’s appeal decision is
difficult, the Court had already held that a defendant’s difficult decision
is not grounds to impinge on her autonomy.213 As such, if the Garza
Court had held otherwise, an attorney could constitutionally refuse to file
a notice of appeal—defying the Court’s protection of a defendant’s right
to appeal.214

210. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018). In McCoy, counsel conceded the
defendant’s guilt—despite the defendant’s unambiguous objection. The Court determined that
counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. See also Capital Punishment:
McCoy v. Louisiana, 132 HARV. L. REV. 377, 377 (2018) (explaining that McCoy answered the
question of whether a defense attorney can admit her client’s guilt without the client’s consent. The
McCoy Court held that control and decision-making within the attorney-client relationship divides
based on the nature of the decision. Strategic trial management decisions are allocated to counsel,
while defendants retain power over fundamental choices, such as whether to plead guilty or to
appeal.).
211. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 747; see Alice Kerr, The Unappealing Turn of Events—Part II:
Supreme Court Holds Defense Lawyer’s Refusal to File Requested Appeal Constitutes Ineffective
Assistance, Despite Defendant’s Appeal Waiver, LEGAL ETHICS IN MOTION (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.legalethicsinmotion.com/2019/03/the-unappealing-turn-of-events-part-ii-supremecourt-holds-defense-lawyers-refusal-to-file-requested-appeal-constitutes-ineffective-assistancedespite-defendants-appeal-w/ [https://perma.cc/G4ED-2L6G] (“Ultimately [Garza’s] decision
reinforces the client’s authority to determine the objectives of legal representation.”); see generally
Andrew Cohen, Gideon Who? The Conservative War on Your Right to Counsel, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/gideon-whoconservative-war-your-right-counsel [https://perma.cc/2YN5-99ZN] (explaining that Garza
ensured that a client has a right to expect that her lawyer will do what she asked the lawyer to do).
212. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000) (explaining that because the decision to
appeal rests with the defendant, the Court concluded that the better practice is for counsel to
routinely consult with the defendant on the possibility of an appeal); see Rieger, supra note 105, at
397 (explaining that Flores-Ortega addressed counsel’s obligations to consult with criminal
defendants about the right to appeal).
213. See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 3 (1987). In Ricketts, the defendant chose—perhaps
for strategic reasons or as a gamble—to interpret his plea agreement in an unfavorable way. Id.; see
also Brief of the Ethics Bureau at Yale as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, Garza v.
Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019) (No. 17-1026) (“It would stand the rationale of Ricketts on its head to
hold the defendant in Ricketts responsible for the consequences of his choice to risk breaching a
plea agreement, while also depriving Mr. Garza of that same choice because he happened to have
a disloyal lawyer who sabotaged his wishes.”); see generally Scheidegger, supra note 170 (“The
U.S. Supreme Court today took up Garza v. Idaho, [] involving the intersection of two recurring
themes: lawyer decisions v. client decisions . . . .”).
214. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 28 (remarking that it “cannot be right” that
counsel’s refusal to file a notice of appeal would deny the defendant her right to appeal); see also
Brief of the Ethics Bureau at Yale as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 213, at 14
(noting that there are only a handful of exceptions allowing attorneys to avoid carrying out their
clients’ wishes, and no exception applied to Garza’s counsel).
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Moreover, the Court reasoned that appeal waivers never eliminate
every appealable issue and correctly concluded that appeal waivers do
not bar an appellate proceeding, as appealable issues always exist.215
Before Garza, defendants who agreed to even broad appeal waivers
brought issues on appeal, demonstrating the Garza Court’s proper
protection of a defendant’s ability to appeal.216 Because every defendant
has at least some issues she may raise on appeal, the Court logically
established that Garza was denied an appellate proceeding, requiring
Flores-Ortega’s presumption because counsel forfeited a proceeding.217
The dissent’s argument that Garza waived his right to appeal through
an appeal waiver is therefore unpersuasive because a defendant never
loses the right to appeal certain issues, even with an appeal waiver.218
The Court soundly refuted the dissent’s argument through its analysis of

215. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 744 (explaining that because plea bargains are essentially
contracts, appeal waivers do not bar appeals outside of their scope (citing to and relying on Puckett
v. United States, 556 U. S. 129, 137 (2009))); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
126, at 50 (noting that most issues on appeal are typically within the scope of an appeal waiver,
barring an appeal of those issues. Occasionally, though, an appealable issue exists outside the scope
of the waiver.).
216. See Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2012) (In Campbell, the
defendant signed an appeal waiver—agreeing to waive the right to challenge his conviction or
sentence on direct appeal or collateral review. The defendant instructed counsel to file a notice of
appeal, but counsel failed to do so. The court determined that counsel provided ineffective
assistance.); see also Brief of the Idaho Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. & the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def.
Law. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 145, at 9 (noting that the Supreme Court
has recognized the tension between the constitutional right of defendants to have an active counsel
on appeal and the professional obligation of counsel to not make frivolous arguments on appeal.
The Court’s holdings, however, have not wavered from the principle that defendants have a right
to file an appeal and to have the assistance of counsel in doing so.).
217. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 747 (explaining that Garza’s appeal waiver did not change the fact
that he was denied an appellate proceeding); see also FYI: Garza v. Idaho, PROSECUTING ATT’YS
COUNCIL
OF
GA.
(Mar.
20,
2019),
https://pacga.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/fyi_3_20_19_Garza_v_Idaho.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B5CX-MMPN]
(explaining that the Flores-Ortega Court reasoned that because a presumption of prejudice applies
whenever the defendant is denied counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, the Court should
presume prejudice when counsel’s deficiency forfeits an appellate proceeding altogether); but see
Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 755 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (highlighting that Garza did not identify a
nonwaived issue to bring on appeal. After all, Garza only identified “sentencing review” as his
primary objective. The dissent would require a defendant to identify claims he would have brought
on appeal for courts to conclude the defendant was denied an appellate proceeding.).
218. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 754−55 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that Garza knowingly
and voluntarily bargained away his appellate rights in exchange for a lower sentencing through his
appeal waiver. Therefore, Garza caused his own forfeiture of an appellate proceeding, not counsel.);
see also Lee, supra note 18 (noting that the dissent agreed with the majority that the decision
whether to appeal lies with a defendant. The dissent, however, argued that when a defendant signs
a plea agreement containing an appeal waiver, she makes the decision to not appeal. Thus, by
refusing to file an appeal, counsel merely “hold[s] the defendant to his own decision . . . .”).
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cases about appeal waivers.219 For example, the Court looked to State v.
Rendon, in which the defendant agreed to an appeal waiver relinquishing
the right to appeal his conviction but not his sentencing.220 When the
defendant sought to appeal his conviction, the State failed to raise the
waiver as proof he had relinquished the right to a conviction appeal.221
The Rendon district court found that the waiver alone did not bar the
defendant’s appeal of his conviction.222 Rather, it precluded the appeal
only with the State’s affirmative proof of such.223
Looking to Rendon, the Garza Court reasoned that when a defendant
seeks an appeal despite an appeal waiver, the State must first demonstrate
that the waiver in fact bars the appeal.224 Accordingly, the Garza majority
disproved the dissent’s position that an appeal waiver automatically
extinguishes a defendant’s right to appeal, as proof of the waiver’s impact
is required.225

219. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 747; see generally United States v. Archie, 771 F.3d 217 (4th Cir.
2014); State v. Rendon, No. 38275, 2012 WL 9492805 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012). The Garza Court
relied on both Archie and Rendon to demonstrate that appeal waivers do not categorically forfeit a
defendant’s right to appeal. After all, if that were the case, courts’ analysis in determining whether
they should grant a defendant an appeal despite an appeal waiver would consist simply in
concluding that if an appeal waiver exists, a defendant has no right to appeal. Courts do not perform
such simple analysis. Rather, courts require the State’s affirmative proof that a defendant’s appeal
waiver in fact bars the particular appellate proceeding.
220. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 747 n.10; see Rendon, No. 38275, 2012 WL 9492805, at *3 n.1 (noting
that the Rendon defendant’s plea agreement provided that the defendant waived his right to appeal
the conviction but that he retained the right to appeal the sentence).
221. Rendon, No. 38275, 2012 WL 9492805, at *3 n.1; see Rendon v. State, No. 43048, 2016
WL 4263051, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016) (explaining that the defendant made an ineffective
assistance claim which was dismissed on the grounds of res judicata, as another court had already
decided the issue).
222. Rendon, No. 38275, 2012 WL 9492805, at *3 n.1 (explaining that the State failed to raise
the defendant’s appeal waiver after the defendant appealed); see Rendon, No. 43048, 2016 WL
4263051, at *4 (noting that the court granted the Rendon defendant a direct appeal because the State
did not demonstrate that the defendant should be denied the appeal).
223. Rendon, No. 38275, 2012 WL 9492805, at *3 n.1.
224. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 747 n.10 (2019); see Rendon, No. 38275, 2012 WL
9492805, at *3 n.1 (explaining that the defendant agreed to waive his right to appeal the judgment
of his conviction but did not waive the right to appeal his sentencing. The State, however, failed to
highlight the provision that waived the defendant’s rights such that the State failed to object to the
defendant’s appeal of the court’s judgment. The court summarized that “the state fail[ed] to raise
the effect of this provision in defense to [the defendant’s] appeal.”).
225. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 747; compare id. (concluding that Garza retained a right to appeal at
least some issues despite his appeal waivers), with Brief for Louisiana, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, supra note 191, at 2 (arguing that under state law, when a defendant waives
her right to appeal, she no longer has any appellate proceeding available to her).

2020]

Garza v. Idaho

315

C. Addressing Defendants’ Disadvantages
The Court examined how its decision would affect the modern criminal
defendant who claims ineffective assistance.226 In doing so, the Garza
Court recognized the split of authority on Flores-Ortega’s presumption
of prejudice, siding with the majority approach.227 Under this approach,
the presumption of prejudice applied, while under the minority approach
it did not.228 The minority approach thus required defendants to prove
both of Strickland’s prongs rather than just the first.229 By applying the
presumption, the Garza Court remedied the higher burden of proof for
defendants in minority jurisdictions.230
Furthermore, the Court recognized that an ineffective assistance claim,
like other post-conviction proceedings, involves heightened standards of
proof for defendants.231 It next discussed a 2007 study indicating that
226. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 749 (relying on ineffective assistance jurisprudence and refusing
to place unfair or ill-advised burdens on defendants (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S.
327, 330 (1969))); see generally Brief of the Idaho Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. & the Nat’l Ass’n of
Crim. Def. Law. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 145, at 24 (noting that if the
Court did not apply the presumption of prejudice, Garza and other like defendants would be placed
in an “unfair trap” because the pleading requirement is higher for post-conviction defendants).
227. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 743 (explaining that the Court granted certiorari to resolve the split of
authority on whether courts should apply the Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice when counsel
failed to file a notice of appeal because of an appeal waiver); see generally Luedtke, supra note 19
(noting the circuit split on the application of the Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice when
counsel failed to file a notice of appeal because of an appeal waiver).
228. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 743; see Garza v. State, Nos. 44015/ 44016, 2017 WL 444026 at *1,
*4 (Idaho Ct. App. 2017) (explaining the minority approach holding that when a defendant waives
her appellate rights, she no longer has a right to appeal, and therefore counsel need not file an appeal
at her client’s request); but see United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir.
2005) (explaining that although the Ninth Circuit followed the majority approach, in this case, it
had doubts. The court noted, in support of the minority approach, that it was wise for the
defendant’s attorney to not file the notice of appeal, as doing so would breach the defendant’s plea
bargain.).
229. Garza, 2017 WL 444026 at *3, *4 (explaining that under the minority approach, courts did
not presume prejudice when counsel defied his client’s instruction to file an appeal because of an
appeal waiver. The minority approach therefore required the defendant to meet the test in
Strickland, which required showing deficient performance and prejudice (citing Nunez v. United
States, 546 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2008))); see Brief of the Cato Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, supra note 21, at 4 (explaining that the minority approach relied primarily on the
argument that if counsel files an appeal notice despite an appeal waiver, the defendant may have
breached the plea bargain. The State may then be entitled to disregard the favorable sentencing.).
230. See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 743 (2019) (explaining that the Garza Court granted
certiorari to resolve the split in authority); see also Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576, 580 (2017) (noting
that under the minority approach, courts do not presume prejudice if an attorney disregards her
client’s instruction to file an appeal when the defendant executed an appeal waiver. The minority
approach therefore requires the defendant to prove both the first and second prongs of the Strickland
standard.).
231. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 749 (“We accordingly decline to place a pleading barrier between a
defendant and an opportunity to appeal that he never should have lost.”); see, e.g., 28 U. S. C.
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over ninety percent of habeas petitioners, such as Garza, proceed without
counsel.232 Defendants who bring a habeas claim, after all, are not
guaranteed the right to counsel because it is a post-conviction
proceeding.233 The Garza Court relied on this study to understand the
disadvantages that defendants like Garza face.234
The Court rightly considered how even defendants with counsel’s
assistance face challenges, such as language barriers.235 As a result, the
Court deemed it unfair to hinge proof of counsel’s prejudice in failing to
file a notice of appeal on whether the defendant effectively
communicated appealable issues to counsel, as the dissent proposed.236
§§ 2254, 2255. These federal laws govern federal court remedies, including habeas corpus
proceedings such as an ineffective assistance claim. The defendant must provide clear and
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of a correct conviction or sentence. See also Brief of
the Idaho Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. & the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 145, at 25 (“The stringent pleading standards for postconviction
petitioners have real teeth. Idaho courts routinely deny relief when petitioners do not submit the
required evidence. . . . None of those standards applies to a criminal defendant prosecuting a direct
appeal.”).
232. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 749 n.12 (citing NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT:
HABEAS LITIGATION IN U. S. DISTRICT COURTS 23 (2007)); see generally, A.B.A. STANDARDS
FOR
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
STANDARD
22-3.1
(AM.
BAR
ASS’N
1978),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal_justice_section_archi
ve/crimjust_standards_postconviction_blk/#22-3.1 [https://perma.cc/RGL2-882H] (last visited
Oct. 31, 2019) (explaining that the State should provide alternate resources for a defendant
proceeding pro se in a post-conviction proceeding when the State cannot provide an attorney).
233. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (describing that the right to appointed
counsel extends only to the “first appeal of right” but not to further proceedings); see Garza, 139
S. Ct. at 749 (noting that most defendants proceed pro se in post-conviction proceedings).
234. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 748 (explaining that a defendant like Garza whose counsel frustrated
his right to appeal should be treated exactly like any other appellant. The Court, therefore, refused
to impose an “additional hurdle to clear” in requiring that Garza prove counsel in fact prejudiced
his chance at an appeal (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 330 (1969))); see
generally Nancy J. King, Judicial Review: Appeals and Postconviction Proceedings, VAND. U. L.,
https://law.vanderbilt.edu/files/publications/King-CH13.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL5U-ZLXH] (last
visited Oct. 31, 2019) (explaining that post-conviction proceedings are a considerable risk because
unlike a direct appeal, in which the Constitution guarantees counsel, most states do not routinely
provide attorneys to assist with post-conviction petitions—not even to prisoners who are illiterate
or suffering from mental illness); but see Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 755 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that pro se defendants almost always bear the burden of showing ineffective assistance of counsel.
Garza’s ineffective assistance claim should therefore not be any different.).
235. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 749 n.13 (explaining that a defendant’s success with an ineffective
assistance claim should not be hinged on how well she can articulate specific issues to appeal); see
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 30 (arguing that, because of a language barrier, a defendant
may not even be aware that counsel committed an error).
236. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 745 (explaining that at the post-conviction stage—when there is
limited time for counsel to file a notice of appeal—the defendant will likely not have important
documents from the trial court, such as the transcripts of key proceedings. Further, the client may
be in custody, rendering communication with counsel all the more challenging.); see, e.g., FED. R.
APP. P. 10(b) (2019) (explaining that under federal appellate law, a defendant cannot order a
transcript from the reporter that is not already on file until after counsel files the defendant’s notice
of appeal).
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The dissent’s requirement would cause some defendants to forfeit their
appeal right merely because they had difficulty communicating their wish
to appeal.237 Instead, the Court properly acknowledged that postconviction defendants face disadvantages which the Flores-Ortega
presumption alleviates by automatically satisfying Strickland’s second
prong.238
D. Trending Toward Client Autonomy, Away from Paternalism
Barnes, Cronic, Strickland, and Flores-Ortega illustrated the Court’s
growing recognition of criminal defendants’ decision-making power.239
In 1983, the Barnes Court reinforced that the defendant holds the ultimate
authority to make certain decisions about her case.240 Shortly after, in
1984, the Cronic Court established that counsel is merely a “guiding
hand” to ensure the defendant receives a fair trial.241 The same year as
Cronic, the Strickland Court emphasized that the defendant makes
informed decisions which influence counsel’s actions.242 In 2000, the
237. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 749 n.13 (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 17); see Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 30 (explaining that defendants who lack facility in the English
language would be unfairly disadvantaged if defendants bore the burden of communicating to their
attorneys which issues to raise on appeal).
238. Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 748 (arguing that courts should not treat a post-conviction defendant,
such as Garza, differently than other defendants seeking an appeal merely because the postconviction defendant’s counsel failed to file a notice of appeal); see Brief for Petitioner, supra note
155, at 21 (explaining that while an appeal waiver is an “additional hurdle” for defendant’s success
on appeal, the Supreme Court already made clear that the appeal waiver does not “cancel out” the
presumption of prejudice).
239. See Brief of the Cato Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 21, at 3
(describing client autonomy as a “bedrock principle” in the United States); see also id. at 4 (arguing
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected paternalistic arguments that override a criminal
defendant’s informed, voluntary decision. Garza should not be any different.); see generally
McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018).
240. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 758 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“What is at issue [in
Barnes] is the relationship between lawyer and client—who has ultimate authority to decide which
nonfrivolous issues should be presented on appeal?”); see JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO
THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 76
(Jack Stark ed., 2002) (explaining that Barnes ensured that certain decision-making power was
guaranteed entirely to defendants. Those decisions are: surrendering the right to a jury, taking the
stand to testify at trial, and deciding whether or not to appeal.); but see Gross, supra note 64, at
1362 (explaining that the Barnes dissent criticized the majority for “unduly restrict[ing] the
individual autonomy and dignity of the defendant.” The dissent argued that counsel should be the
instrument of the client’s autonomy, rather than the “engineer of an appeal” which the client does
not support (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983))).
241. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S.
91, 100 (1955)); see Brief for Respondent, supra note 152, at 22 (noting that Cronic supported a
presumption of ineffective assistance to ease defendants’ burdens of proof).
242. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984); but see W. Bradley Wendel,
Autonomy Isn’t Everything: Some Cautionary Notes on McCoy v. Louisiana, 9 ST. MARY’S J. ON
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 92, 97 (2018) (recognizing that the Strickland Court qualified its
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Flores-Ortega Court highlighted that the defendant holds the power of
instructing counsel to appeal, and counsel must defer to her wishes.243
Together, the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates its
expanding protection of criminal defendants’ autonomy.244 The Garza
Court aligned by expanding criminal defendants’ decision-making
power.245
Additionally, the Court’s protection of defendants seeking an appeal is
in keeping with its shift away from paternalism.246 In criminal law,
paternalism is the government’s ability to make decisions for a defendant
to protect her, typically through appointed counsel.247 The Court has
increasingly rejected paternalistic rules that limit defendants’ voluntary

protection of client autonomy. The Court, after all, also emphasized the importance of deferring to
counsel’s strategic choices.).
243. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 485 (2000); see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155,
at 23 (explaining that the Flores-Ortega Court established that the decision to appeal rests only
with the defendant).
244. See Brief of the Cato Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 21, at 5
(explaining that the principle of defendant autonomy underlies the Supreme Court’s decisions in a
wide range of contexts, including the decision of whether or not to take an appeal. Taken as a whole,
the jurisprudence established that “autonomy is a bedrock principle of the Sixth Amendment, and
due process more generally.”); see generally Donald N. Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable
Populations: The Supreme Court’s Reckless Disregard for Self-Determination and Social Science,
37 VILL. L. REV. 1569, 1572 (1992) (“The Supreme Court has at least paid lip service to autonomy
as a social value”).
245. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 750 (2019) (noting that when an attorney performed
deficiently in failing to file a notice of appeal, despite the defendant’s express instructions to appeal,
courts should apply a presumption of prejudice); see Jacobi & Sag, supra note 125 (noting that a
2018 Supreme Court case, McCoy v. Louisiana, embraced client autonomy. Likewise, in Garza,
the Court established that regardless of counsel’s concerns about jeopardizing a favorable plea deal
by filing a notice of appeal, the client must have the choice to make that potentially unfavorable
decision.).
246. See Brief of the Cato Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 21, at 4
(“When it comes to those fundamental matters within the scope of a criminal defendant’s
autonomy, this Court has repeatedly rejected similar paternalistic arguments for overriding a
defendant’s informed, voluntary decision. There is no reason [Garza v. Idaho] should be any
different.”); see also Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right
to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2010) (“[T]he paternalistic notion that lawyers
should be entrusted with all decision-making in criminal cases because their law degrees qualify
them to choose more wisely than defendants lacks empirical support [and] is inconsistent with
landmark Supreme Court precedent . . . .”).
247. See Christophe Béal, Can Paternalism Be “Soft”? Paternalism and Criminal Justice, 44
RAISONS POLITIQUES 41, 42 (2011) (explaining that criminal legislation is paternalistic if it seeks
to prohibit peoples’ conduct that may harm them); see also Peter Suber, Paternalism, in
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA (Christopher B. Grey ed., 1999), reprinted in Peter
Suber, Paternalism, EARLHAM COLL., https://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/paternal.htm
[https://perma.cc/MW36-UESN] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (explaining that an entity acts
paternalistically when it acts for the good of another person without that person’s consent, as
parents do for children. Paternalism is perhaps “nowhere as divisive as in criminal law.” After all,
in criminal law, the State coercively acts for the defendants’ good, often against defendants’ wills.).
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decisions.248 For instance, it has honored defendants’ autonomy to make
decisions about their trial, even if the decisions involve significant
consequences.249 Consistent with this trend, the Garza Court established
that unfavorable consequences, such as breaching a plea bargain or losing
on appeal, cannot preclude a defendant from deciding whether to
appeal.250
Overall, the Garza decision is sound because it accords with Sixth
Amendment precedents about the presumption of prejudice. The Court
conformed with jurisprudence on appeal waivers and addressed the
disadvantages of defendants like Garza. It also affirmed the Court’s trend
of protecting client autonomy and rejecting paternalism.
IV. DISRUPTED PLEA BARGAINS SAVED BY REDUCED BURDENS
The decision in Garza clarifies and extends the Flores-Ortega
presumption of prejudice.251 It may, however, decrease the finality of
plea bargain sentencings and reduce the impact of appeal waivers and
notices of appeal.252 Even so, Garza provides an efficient rule for courts

248. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 108–09 (1975) (White, J., concurring) (noting that
the Court has consistently rejected paternalistic rules that protect a defendant from her intelligent
and voluntary decisions about her own case, unless a defendant is incompetent. If courts shielded
defendants from their decisions, courts would not be respecting the individual, who is the lifeblood
of the law. (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975))); see generally Randall L. Klein,
Sixth Amendment—Paternalistic Override of Waiver of Right to Conflict-Free Counsel at Expense
of Right to Counsel of One’s Choice, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 735, 757 n.163 (1988) (noting
that the court may be justified in acting paternalistically when the defendant might be incompetent).
249. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018) (“These [counsel’s decisions] are
not strategic choices about how best to achieve a client’s objectives; they are choices about what
the client’s objectives in fact are.”); see also Brief of the Cato Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, supra note 21, at 15 (arguing that because defendants are permitted to risk the death
penalty by making decisions in their trial, they should then be permitted to decide whether to risk
losing the benefits of a plea agreement by appealing).
250. See Brief of the Cato Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 21, at 2
(noting that criminal defense is “personal business.” A criminal defendant may never face a more
consequential occasion than her prosecution; thus, the defendant should be the decision-maker.).
251. Lee, supra note 18 (explaining that the Garza Court “confirm[ed] the applicability of
Flores-Ortega,” and thereby extended the application of the presumption of prejudice); see
Amanda Gurman, Supreme Court Decision Impacts Assistance-of-Counsel Claims, RIVKIN
RADLER (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.rivkinradler.com/publications/supreme-court-decisionimpacts-assistance-of-counsel-claims/ [https://perma.cc/WW9N-5ATM] (noting that in Garza, the
Supreme Court expanded on Flores-Ortega’s exemption to the prejudice requirement, holding that
prejudice can be presumed even if the defendant waived her right to an appeal).
252. See McGinnis, supra note 158 (explaining that before Garza, an appeal waiver gave
counsel a plausible reason to not appeal a sentencing); see also Lee, supra note 18 (explaining that
Garza’s plea agreement waiving his right to appeal is a practice that has become “commonplace
throughout the nation.”).
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assessing ineffective assistance claims while easing defendants’ burden
of proof.253
A. Destabilized Plea Bargain Processes
1. Plea Bargain Sentencings
In Garza, the Court prioritized a defendant’s right to appeal over the
judicial efficiency of decreased appeals.254 In fact, before Garza, courts
relied on appeal waivers in plea bargains to reduce appeals,255 given
appeal waivers rendered a sentencing unappealable and thus final.256 But
in the wake of Garza, defendants can appeal despite an appeal waiver—
thereby undermining the finality of a plea bargain sentencing.257
253. See Neily & Schweikert, supra note 179 (noting that Garza secured a defendant’s
fundamental right to decide whether to appeal a conviction, even when obtained through a plea
bargain with an appeal waiver. Garza is particularly important because of the increasing prevalence
of plea bargaining, rather than jury trials, as the default means of adjudicating criminal cases.); see
also Dalia Deak, A Win for Criminal Defendants at the U.S. Supreme Court, HARV. CLINICAL &
PRO BONO PROGRAMS (Apr. 18, 2019), https://blogs.harvard.edu/clinicalprobono/2019/04/18/awin-for-criminal-defendants-at-the-u-s-supreme-court/
[https://perma.cc/5XLZ-8RYB]
(explaining that Garza was an important challenge to a “fundamentally unjust practice” in which
counsel could act in disregard of her client’s wishes); see also Davlin, supra note 136 (explaining
that the Court’s decision in Garza has “nationwide implications” in providing more clarity on how
certain rights are waived in court).
254. See Basem Besada & Luís L. Lozada, Gilberto Garza, Jr. v. Idaho, CORNELL L. SCH.: LII
SUP. CT. BULLETIN, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/17-1026 [https://perma.cc/9YYP9WWA] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019) (predicting that the outcome of Garza would affect states that
use appeal waivers to prevent frivolous appeals and promote judicial efficiency); see also Epstein,
supra note 165 (noting that Garza ensured that lawyers always protect a defendant’s right to seek
review through an appeal).
255. See Lee, supra note 21 (explaining that prosecutors commonly insist on including appeal
waivers in plea agreements to reduce defendants’ appeals from guilty pleas); see also King &
O’Neill, supra note 44, at 230 (describing a study in which prosecutors stated their shared belief
that appeal waivers reduce their appellate burdens).
256. See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 755 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Garza’s rule will burden the appellate courts that must address appeals arising from plea bargains
with appellate waivers); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, supra note 167, at 14 (explaining that an appeal waiver “puts to rest” various issues
which a defendant would otherwise have a right to appeal); see generally Davlin, supra note 136
(predicting that, after Garza, there will be a “big shift in procedure and how cases flow through the
system.”).
257. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 755 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that Garza
undermines the finality of criminal judgments because it affirms defendants’ right to appeal even
when an appeal waiver is present); see also Nicarican (@TheNicarican), TWITTER (Feb. 27, 2019),
https://twitter.com/SCOTUSblog/status/1100774994932580357 (noting that Garza agreed to
appeal waivers, which the Garza Court seemed to ignore, such that “nothing [has] meaning or
consequence anymore”); see generally Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018
[https://perma.cc/8GLP-XZUN] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019) (noting that the amount of criminal
appeals has decreased over time, so criminal appellate court caseloads are relatively small. From
March 2017 through March 2018, criminal appeals decreased over six percent from the prior year.
Criminal appeals have decreased nearly one-third compared to their amount in 2009.).
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Considering the questionable legitimacy of some plea bargains, though,
Garza correctly guarantees defendants the right to appeal a plea
sentencing even if they agreed to an appeal waiver. 258 In sum, Garza
enables defendants to appeal a sentencing from a guilty plea, while before
Garza, a sentencing was more final.259
2. Notices of Appeal
Garza may not only decrease the finality of plea sentencings, it may
also weaken the significance of notices of appeal.260 Prior to Garza,
counsel could use her professional judgment in determining whether to
file a notice of appeal, and courts in minority jurisdictions would have
likely deemed that effective assistance.261 Yet after Garza, even if a client
has no chance of success on appeal, counsel must file a notice of appeal
upon her client’s request.262
As a result, Garza’s requirement that counsel file the notice is
equivalent to courts presuming a notice of appeal for all defendants,
which would save attorneys time.263 Instead, even if her client will not
258. See Neily & Schweikert, supra note 179 (“[P]lea bargains of dubious legal and moral
legitimacy make up the overwhelming percentage of today’s criminal convictions . . . .”); see also
Kershaw, supra note 132 (describing that even though Garza had agreed to waive most of his
appellate rights, he still had the right to file a notice of appeal in order to preserve his appeal. The
Court protected this right in Garza.).
259. Brief of the Idaho Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. & the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 145, at 6; see A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.
CRIM.
APPEALS:
STANDARD
21-1.1
(AM.
BAR.
ASS’N
1978),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal_justice_section_archi
ve/crimjust_standards_crimappeals_blk/#1.1 [https://perma.cc/3DA5-NEPH] (last visited Oct. 18,
2019) (“The possibility of appellate review of trial court judgments should exist for every criminal
conviction.” As such, a trial court determination which a court of appeals cannot review is
undesirable.).
260. See Brief for Louisiana, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 191 at
1–2 (explaining that appeal waivers are “meaningful bargaining chips” for defendants in plea
bargains); see also Greenfield, supra note 141 (arguing that Garza’s requirement that counsel file
a notice of appeal could be more efficiently replaced with an assumption that counsel has filed a
notice of appeal for each defendant, rather than requiring counsel to do what then becomes a legally
meaningless act).
261. See McCue, supra note 15 (explaining that two federal courts of appeals did not apply the
Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice when counsel failed to file a notice of appeal because the
defendant agreed to an appeal waiver); see generally Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 456
(7th Cir. 2008) (demonstrating that before Garza, the Seventh Circuit, for example, did not require
courts to presume prejudice when counsel failed to file a notice of appeal).
262. Greenfield, supra note 141 (explaining that after Garza, a notice of appeal is “just a piece
of paper, a pro forma submission, the purpose of which is now lost to the ages.”); see Garza, 139
S. Ct. at 746 n.8 (explaining that a defendant’s right to appeal should not be hinged on counsel’s
“bare assertion” that she believes there is no merit to the appeal (quoting to and relying on Penson
v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988))).
263. Greenfield, supra note 141 (explaining that after Garza, defense attorneys will have to file
a notice of appeal “just for kicks” to avoid being penalized for ineffective assistance. Yet, because
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succeed on appeal, counsel must expend time in filing the notice, though
futile.264 Nonetheless, the decision mandates that counsel file a requested
notice of appeal and ensures that courts, rather than counsel, decide
whether the defendant has an appealable issue.265
3. Appeal Waivers as Part of Plea Bargains
The Garza decision may reduce appeal waivers’ effect in barring
appeals.266 Consequently, the Court may have complicated plea bargains
that contain an appeal waiver.267 Before Garza, prosecutors
recommended lighter sentencings for defendants who agreed to a waiver
because the sentence was final.268 Following Garza, though, prosecutors

counsel may in fact not have any issue to appeal, courts should more efficiently presume counsel
has filed a notice of appeal for all defendants and then assess any meritorious issue on appeal.); see
Files, supra note 154 (noting that after Garza, counsel is required to file a notice of appeal if the
client requested it, even if the court followed a plea recommendation and the defendant signed an
appeal waiver); but see Justice Thomas Decries Court’s Latest “Defendant-Always-Wins” Rule,
APP. SQUAWK (Mar. 2, 2019), https://appellatesquawk.wordpress.com/2019/03/02/justice-thomasdecries-courts-latest-defendant-always-wins-rule/ [https://perma.cc/RA76-FWL2] (“A notice of
appeal is nothing but a form that takes [counsel] five minutes to fill out . . . .”).
264. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 747 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing that in Garza’s case,
counsel’s act of filing a notice of appeal would have been “worse than pointless.” If counsel filed
a notice of appeal, he would have created “serious risks” for Garza because he would breach
Garza’s plea bargain.); see generally Steve Kalar, Case o’ The Week: When in Doubt, File it Out—
Fabian-Baltazar and Duty to File Notice of Appeal, NINTH CIR. BLOG (Aug. 4, 2019, 9:08 AM)
http://circuit9.blogspot.com/2019/08/case-o-week-when-in-doubt-file-it-out.html
[https://perma.cc/9CAK-45UW] (explaining that after Garza, it would be “simpler just to eliminate
appellate waivers altogether[]”); but see Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738, 744 (1967) (arguing
that a notice of appeal preserves the opportunity for an appeal).
265. See Greenfield, supra note 141 (noting that a defendant has a right to appeal a pleabargaining sentence, even if the court has followed the plea recommendation); see also Amir Ali,
Access to Courts: Garza v. Idaho, MACARTHUR JUST. CTR. (Jan. 23, 2018)
https://www.macarthurjustice.org/case/garza-v-idaho-u-s-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/46E96KD7] (explaining that Garza concerned one of the clearest instances in which a defense attorney
abandoned a defendant and deprived the defendant of his right to appellate review).
266. See Plea Waivers and Ineffectiveness of Counsel for Failing to Appeal Come to SCOTUS
in Garza v. Idaho, supra note 121 (explaining that “[t]he big policy question that underlies [Garza]
is to what degree the courts will enforce appeal waivers”); see also Sorenson, supra note 37, at 33
(describing that before Garza, an appeal waiver was “indefinite and permanent” and usually did
not include exceptions to its application).
267. Plea Waivers and Ineffectiveness of Counsel for Failing to Appeal Come to SCOTUS in
Garza v. Idaho, supra note 121 (noting that by allowing a defendant to appeal despite an appeal
waiver, Garza throws “an element of doubt” into the plea-bargaining process).
268. See The Basics of A Plea Waiver, BERRY L. FIRM, https://jsberrylaw.com/blog/the-basicsof-a-plea-bargain/ [https://perma.cc/ZGM8-VDH2] (last visited Oct. 18, 2019) (explaining that in
a plea bargain, a prosecutor agrees to recommend a lighter sentence for certain charges if the
defendant agrees to plead guilty or to not contest the sentencing); see also Lindsey Devers, Plea
and Charge Bargaining: Research Summary, US. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Jan. 24, 2011)
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/PleaBargainingResearchSummar
y.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX49-M989] (noting several studies have found that defendants who pled
guilty were more likely to receive lighter sentences than if they had gone to trial).
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offering a plea bargain with a waiver are cognizant the defendant can
appeal.269
A defendant’s ability to appeal despite an appeal waiver may affect
how prosecutors both offer and uphold plea bargains.270 First,
prosecutors will likely question their incentive to offer a lighter
sentencing because a defendant, after Garza, can appeal the sentencing
for an even lighter one—despite an appeal waiver.271 As a result,
prosecutors may include heavier sentencings in plea bargains with appeal
waivers to account for the appealability.272 Second, prosecutors might
revoke plea bargains when defendants appeal sentences because of the
defendants’ potential breach by appealing.273 If a prosecutor revokes, a
269. See Greenfield, supra note 141(arguing that if the Garza Court “wanted to give meaning
to a defendant’s right to appeal following a plea agreement,” it would eliminate appeal waivers
altogether rather than allow a defendant to appeal despite an appeal waiver); see also Brief for
Louisiana, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 191, at 1 (predicting that if
the Garza Court held that counsel must file a notice of appeal despite an appeal waiver, it would
allow a defendant to “sandbag the system” by negotiating a plea deal and then ignoring it).
270. See Brief for Louisiana, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 191, at
5 (arguing that the Garza Court’s application of the Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice would
grant defendants a new “right” to breach promises made in plea bargains. In turn, prosecutors, wary
of defendants breaching a plea bargain by appealing, may breach their end of the plea bargain
promise. If so, defendants may receive longer sentences, more cases may go to trial, and final
sentencing will take longer.); see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 152, at 13−14 (explaining
that if Garza’s counsel filed a notice of appeal, Garza could have breached the plea agreement—
thereby releasing the prosecution from its plea agreement obligations. As such, the prosecution
could have charged Garza with additional felonies or could have sought a life sentence.).
271. See Brief for Louisiana, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 191, at
1 (predicting that the Garza decision would remove any incentive for prosecutors to offer
defendants reduced sentences and charges in exchange for appeal waivers); see also United States
v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining that prosecutors value appeal waivers as a
means of “preserv[ing] the finality of judgments and sentences imposed pursuant to valid pleas of
guilty.”); see generally Richard Ansara, Appeal Waiver in Criminal Plea Bargain at Issue in Case
Before
SCOTUS,
THE
ANSARA
L.
FIRM
(Nov.
15,
2018)
https://www.fortlauderdalecriminalattorneyblog.com/appeal-waiver-in-criminal-plea-bargain-atissue-in-case-before-scotus/ [https://perma.cc/UY9U-AQFW] (explaining that Garza will impact
how federal and state courts resolve criminal plea bargains).
272. See Brief for Louisiana, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 191, at
3 (noting that the terms of a plea bargain require the prosecutor to offer a certain sentence); see also
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 167, at 17 (noting
that because of appeal waivers, prosecutors are more likely to provide favorable sentencings to
defendants); see generally Kalar, supra note 264 (explaining that after Garza, defense attorneys
concerns about the government breaching a plea bargain will increase. The government may, after
all, start backing out of plea bargains when a defendant requests an appeal despite an appeal
waiver.).
273. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 167,
at 18 (explaining that if a defendant agreed to an appeal waiver but appeals, the court may conclude
that the defendant breached the plea agreement. As such, the prosecutor could withdraw any
defendant-friendly concessions that were part of the plea agreement.); see also Greenfield, supra
note 141 (arguing that Garza “gained nothing but his name on a Supreme Court opinion” and could
have lost his favorable plea bargain sentencing); but see Davlin, supra note 136 (explaining that
counsel’s act of filling a notice of appeal does not necessarily breach a defendant’s plea bargain).
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defendant loses the opportunity for a lighter sentence.274 To illustrate,
Garza benefited from a ten-year sentence as a result of his plea bargain;
if the prosecutor had revoked his plea bargain, the court could have
sentenced him to life in prison.275 Garza may therefore destabilize plea
bargain processes by prompting prosecutors to rethink defendantfavorable sentencings.276
B. Reduced Burdens for Courts and Defendants
If the Garza Court had aligned with the minority view on FloresOrtega’s presumption, courts would face a line-drawing problem in
determining whether the defendant sufficiently satisfied Strickland’s
prejudice prong.277 The Court instead affirmed Flores-Ortega’s efficient
rule which automatically satisfies it.278 In turn, the decision eased courts’
ineffective assistance analyses, requiring them to evaluate only the first
prong of unreasonableness when counsel failed to file a notice of
appeal.279
274. See Brief for Louisiana, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 191, at
16 (explaining that if prosecutors backed out of plea bargains, defendants would “lose the benefits
of the bargain”—thereby returning the defendant to the position of being tried and sentenced); see
also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 167, at 29
(explaining that if the prosecution backs out of a plea bargain in response to the defendant’s
perceived breach of the agreement, the defendant would risk losing the benefits of the plea
agreement).
275. See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 750 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that Garza
avoided a potential life sentence by negotiating with the State of Idaho for reduced charges and a
ten-year sentence as part of his plea bargain); see also Brief for Louisiana, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, supra note 191, at 4 (explaining that if Garza’s counsel had filed the notice
of appeal, the prosecutor may have concluded that Garza breached the plea agreement. As such,
rather than Garza’s ten-year sentence under the plea agreement, he could have received two life
sentences.).
276. See Brief for Louisiana, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 191, at
14 (explaining that before Garza, courts never recognized a right to breach a plea bargain. After
Garza, however, a defendant’s appeal despite an appeal waiver may cause the prosecutor to back
out of the plea bargain, thereby breaching the agreement.); see also Kalar, supra note 264
(explaining that after Garza, attorneys “in the trenches” worry about the government backing out
of deals).
277. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 8 (noting that, without the presumption, courts’
challenges in assessing ineffective assistance claims would be “made all the more difficult because
appeal waivers come in all shapes and sizes.” Therefore, if the Garza Court did not apply the
presumption , its ruling would be “unworkable and inefficient.”); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 126, at 49 (remarking that there is no evidence of practical problems resulting
from a presumption of prejudice applied to cases like Garza’s).
278. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 9 (advocating for the application of Flores-Ortega’s
rule); see Kalar, supra note 264 (explaining that Garza is a “nice outcome” because defendants get
to file appeals despite appeal waivers).
279. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 755 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that Garza’s rule
“may be easy to administer”); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 37−38 (“It is far more
efficient simply to grant a defendant a new appeal once he has demonstrated that his attorney
disregarded his instruction to file a notice of appeal.”).
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Similarly, Garza reduced defendants’ burden in proving ineffective
assistance claims.280 If the Court had declined to apply the Flores-Ortega
presumption, Garza would have had to show counsel’s failure to file a
notice prejudiced his case.281 Proceeding without counsel,282 Garza
would have needed to prove both of Strickland’s prongs on his own.283
And as a post-conviction defendant, Garza faced pleading standards
higher than in other proceedings.284 Specifically, under Idaho law, a postconviction petition must contain more than a short and plain statement of
the claim.285 Garza would have thus needed to provide affidavits, records,
or other evidence to meet both prongs rather than just the first.286

280. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 22 (noting the explanation by Garza’s
attorney that there are “added hurdles that go along with habeas proceedings that a defendant would
now have to go through, not because he made any mistake, but because his agent failed to undertake
a ministerial task”); see also Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 748 (arguing that the State of Idaho’s denial of a
presumption of prejudice was “both unfair and inefficient in practice”).
281. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 65−66 (“[T]he normal burden under
Strickland is that a defendant who seeks to reopen an otherwise final judgment has the burden in
all cases to establish that he was prejudiced.”); see also Greenfield, supra note 141 (“[Garza] was
a significant decision, as it would otherwise fall to the defendant to meet the requirements of
Strickland v. Washington `to show that counsel’s screw-up, the failure to file the notice, would
survive the second-prong of the test, that there was a reasonable probability of a different
outcome.”).
282. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (“There is no constitutional right to
an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings.”); see also Brief of the Idaho Ass’n of Crim. Def.
Law. & the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 145,
at 26 (“[U]nder Idaho law, a post-conviction petitioner has no statutory right to post-conviction
counsel except in capital cases.” (citing Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 395 (2014))).
283. Garza v. Idaho, FINDLAW, https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/17-1026.html
[https://perma.cc/2W8B-AG5J] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019) (explaining that defendants do not have
the right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. As such, the government’s argument against
the application of the Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice would be “unfair, ill advised, and
unworkable.”); see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 9 (“[J]ust as in Flores-Ortega, it would
be ‘unfair’ to require an indigent, usually pro se defendant to specify the grounds he wishes to
appeal in order to establish that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance.”).
284. See Brief of the Idaho Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. & the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 145, at 4 (explaining that even if a defendant can
raise a claim in postconviction proceedings, the defendant will typically have to do so under
heightened pleading standards); see, e.g., Pentico v. State, 360 P.3d 359, 363 (Idaho Ct. App. 2015)
(explaining that a defendant’s postconviction petition must present admissible evidence supporting
its allegations. If not, the court may dismiss the petition.).
285. Pentico, 360 P.3d at 363 (noting that a post-conviction petition must contain “much more
than a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint”); see, e.g., Fields
v. State, 314 P.3d 587, 591 (Idaho 2013) (detailing same).
286. Pentico, 360 P.3d at 363; Fields, 314 P.3d at 591 (citing Idaho Code §19-4903); see Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 155, at 9 (arguing that courts should not penalize a defendant with the
loss of an appellate proceeding merely because she cannot articulate the claims she might have
pursued with the assistance of counsel).
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Therefore, Garza would have had to prove counsel acted unreasonably
in failing to file a notice of appeal and that counsel prejudiced his case.287
For the prejudice proof, Idaho law required Garza to demonstrate that his
case’s outcome likely would have been different, had counsel filed a
notice.288 Garza would have thus needed to show that the court of appeals
probably would have reduced his sentence.289 The Garza presumption of
prejudice, however, eliminated this proof for Garza and all similar
defendants.290
C. Inapplicable in Criminal Settlements
While Garza controls when a defendant executes an appeal waiver in
a plea bargain, the Court left unanswered whether its rule applies to an
appeal waiver in agreements other than a plea bargain, like a criminal
settlement.291 Some states permit appeal waivers in settlements resolving

287. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 23 (arguing that without the Court’s
application of the Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice, Garza would have had to show that it
was unreasonable for counsel to not file the notice of appeal and that counsel’s inaction prejudiced
Garza); see also Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 752–53 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining
that Garza failed to prove either prong of the Strickland standard: (1) that counsel’s conduct was
deficient and (2) that counsel prejudiced his case).
288. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The second prong of the
Strickland standard requires the defendant to prove that counsel’s deficient performance resulted
in prejudice. Id.; see also Greenfield, supra note 141 (noting that it would be an “absurd burden”
for Garza to meet the second prong of the Strickland standard).
289. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 167,
at 8 (explaining that Garza would have to “identify nonfrivolous grounds for appealing despite the
waiver”); see also Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576, 579−80 (2017) (noting the Idaho Supreme Court’s
requirement that Garza show that counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial. Under Idaho’s
heightened standard, Garza would have to show that there was a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s deficiencies, the result of the proceeding would have been different, as the court
would have granted Garza an appeal.).
290. Brief of the Idaho Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. & the Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 146, at 6; see Notices of Appeal, Appellate Waivers, and
Effective Assistance: SCOTUS Gives Us Garza v. Idaho and Another Reminder to File Those NOAs,
FERTITTA & REYNAL, LLP (Mar. 4, 2019), https://frlaw.us/notices-of-appeal-appellate-waiversand-effective-assistance-scotus-gives-us-garza-v-idaho-and-another-reminder-to-file-those-noas/
[https://perma.cc/Z6YG-A822] (explaining that the Garza decision gave “defendants with
appellate waivers a point on the scoreboard”).
291. See SCOTUS: Lawyer Who Ignores Client’s Request For Appeal From Guilty Plea Is
Ineffective, ON POINT: WIS. STATE PUB. DEF. (Mar. 7, 2019), http://www.wisconsinappeals.net/onpoint-by-the-wisconsin-state-public-defender/scotus-lawyer-who-ignores-clients-request-forappeal-from-guilty-plea-is-ineffective/ [https://perma.cc/NJM4-FMW5] (noting that, for example,
state plea agreements in Wisconsin do not include appeal waivers. Post-conviction motions,
however, are sometimes resolved through settlements that include appeal waivers.); see also Anup
Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) (explaining that parties can agree to a
settlement of a habeas proceeding. Nonetheless, parties rarely resolve habeas proceedings outside
of the courtroom.).
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a post-conviction motion.292 Such waivers state that the defendant cannot
appeal any order which the court issues from the settlement.293 The Garza
decision does not indicate whether counsel’s failure to file a notice of
appeal in this context also requires Flores-Ortega’s presumption.294
The Court would likely decline to extend Garza to counsel’s failure to
file a notice from a settlement,295 because the Sixth Amendment does not
guarantee post-conviction defendants the right to counsel.296 The right to
counsel confers the right to the effective assistance of counsel, which is
necessary for an ineffective assistance claim.297 Post-conviction
defendants, lacking the right to counsel, cannot bring an ineffective
assistance claim.298 Absent such a claim, the Strickland standard is not
triggered, rendering the Garza rule inapplicable when counsel failed to
file a notice of appeal in a criminal settlement.
CONCLUSION
Garza v. Idaho is a proper continuation of the Supreme Court’s Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. It correctly extended the Flores-Ortega
presumption of prejudice when counsel failed to file a notice of appeal,
292. See SCOTUS: Lawyer Who Ignores Client’s Request For Appeal From Guilty Plea Is
Ineffective, supra note 291 (explaining that in Wisconsin, for example, parties occasionally resolve
post-conviction motions that include appeal waivers).
293. See Waiver: Right to Appeal May be Waived as Part of Settlement Agreement, CAUSE OF
ACTION BLOG (Nov. 1, 2011), https://causeofactionelements.blogspot.com/2011/11/waiver-rightto-appeal-may-be-waived-as.html [https://perma.cc/X7JZ-PSD8] (explaining that, in a settlement
hearing, the court asks the defendant if she agrees to no longer prosecute the appeal and if she
agrees to not appeal an order of the court); see also Max S. Meckstroth, Wisconsin Court of Appeals
Enforces Parties’ Stipulation to Remedies and Waiver of Judicial Review in Administrative
Proceeding,
FOLEY
&
LARDNER
LLP
(Nov.
14,
2016),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2016/11/wisconsin-court-of-appeals-enforcesparties-stipul [https://perma.cc/2QLX-NE7Y] (describing a settlement agreement which provided
that the defendant agreed to “waive its statutory right to judicial review”—thereby waiving her
right to appeal).
294. See SCOTUS: Lawyer Who Ignores Client’s Request For Appeal From Guilty Plea Is
Ineffective, supra note 291 (asking whether Garza would apply when parties agree to resolve a
post-conviction motion with a settlement that includes an appeal waiver. If counsel fails to appeal
the outcome of the settlement, the question is then whether counsel provided ineffective assistance
of counsel.); see generally Meckstroth, supra note 293 (explaining that state statutory provisions
guaranteeing a court’s judicial review do not prohibit parties from agreeing to waive the right to
appeal as part of a settlement).
295. See Malani, supra note 291 (noting that criminal plea bargains, like Garza’s, are very
similar to a post-conviction settlement. For example, in both, the defendant receives a shorter, more
certain sentence. Further, in both, the attorneys avoid having to litigate a case.).
296. Garza v. Idaho, FINDLAW, supra note 283 (explaining that post-conviction defendants do
not have the right to counsel).
297. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (expanding the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of the assistance of counsel to the guarantee of the assistance of effective counsel).
298. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (explaining that post-conviction
defendants do not have a right to counsel and thus cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel).
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thereby strengthening criminal defendants’ right to appeal. Accordingly,
the Garza Court designated a defendant’s wish to appeal as superior to
counsel’s judgment that an appeal is unwarranted. Garza requires that
counsel file a notice of appeal upon her client’s request regardless of an
appeal waiver. If counsel failed to do so, courts must apply a presumption
of prejudice to automatically meet Strickland’s second prong. In
satisfying this prong, the Garza presumption aligned with Sixth
Amendment precedent and reinforced defendants’ autonomy. Ultimately,
Garza may destabilize plea bargain processes, but these processes can be
of questionable legitimacy, and the Court rightly risked disrupting them
to protect criminal defendants’ right to appeal.

